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ARTICLES
FATAL SUBTRACTION: STATISTICAL MIAs ON
THE INDUSTRIAL BATTLEFIELD
Marc Linder©
[W]hen the dead bodies of girls are found piled up against locked doors leading to
the exits after a factory fire... who wants to hear about a great relief fund? What
we want is to start a revolution.
If we undertake to stop this unnecessary killing and injuring of workers in
the course of industry... [t]he first thing we need is... complete and accurate
information about the accidents that are happening. It seems a tame thing to drop
so suddenly from talk of revolutions to talk of statistics. But I believe in statistics
just as firmly as I believe in revolutions. And what is more, I believe statistics are
good stuff to start a revolution with.'
A million workers in the United States have been killed in the line of duty alone
since the mid-1920s.2 Yet not until the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(OSHA) went into effect were employers generally obligated to "furnish to each of
[their] employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recog-
nized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to
[their] employees."3 In order to promote this purpose, Congress ordered the Secretary
of Labor to "develop and maintain an effective program of collection, compilation, and
analysis of occupational safety and health statistics." Since that time it has been the
Department of Labor's duty to "compile accurate statistics on work injuries and ill-
nesses which shall include all disabling, serious, or significant injuries and illnesses,
whether or not involving loss of time from work, other than minor injuries . . ..
Yet almost a quarter-century passed before the U.S. government even purported
to know how many workers had been killed in the previous year by workplace injuries.
The far greater number--estimated at 100,000 annually 5-succumbing to occupational
© Professor, The University of Iowa.
1. Crystal Eastman, The Three Essentials for Accident Prevention, 38 ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. SC. 98, 99 (1911).
2. A total of 938,400 fatalities has been estimated for the years 1928 through 1992. Calculated
according to data in NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 1993 EDITION 26-27 (1993). For
the mid-1920s, the managing director of the same organization estimated average annual industrial
fatalities at 23,000. W. H. Cameron, Organizing for Safety Nationally, 123 ANNALS, Jan. 1926, at 27,
30.
3. Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 5(a), 84 Stat. 1590, 1593 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1)
(1988)).
4. Id at § 24(a), 84 Stat. at 1614 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 673(a)).
5. OSHA Injury and Illness Information System: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong, 2d Sess. 27 (1984) (testimony of Karl Kronebusch,
U.S. Office of Technology Assessment). Estimates range from 10,000 to 210,000.
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illnesses and diseases neither the new Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries nor any
governmental or private organization pretends to know.6
Thus, implausible as it may seem, despite the fact that the last state (Mississippi)
enacted a workers' compensation statute almost a half-century ago, the United States
still lacks comprehensive and accurate data on work-related fatalities. Public conscious-
ness of the dangerousness of employment is not only underdeveloped, but shaped by
and filtered through another agenda. For while the trade press concedes that "[t]he
[construction] industry remains unnecessarily dangerous as a whole," its concerns
appear to be not those whose lives are prematurely terminated, but employers' profits:
a tripling of workers' compensation costs during the past decade is said to be "bleed-
ing the industry dry. 7
Throughout the twentieth century, one refrain of industrial accident literature has
been martial: "War is commonly regarded as the most destructive of human events.
But . . . occupational injuries cause far more casualties than war."' And if "the work-
shop is more dangerous than the battle field," then the American industrial battlefield
is the most dangerous of all.9 The leading early twentieth-century U.S. authority on
workers' compensation for industrial accidents opened one of his books with an ex-
tended comparison between war and peace. Estimating, in the absence of national data,
25,000 deaths annually, E.H. Downey calculated that
work accidents in the aggregate are equivalent to the losses of a perpetual cam-
paign. Of deaths alone the twelve months' total is four times the number killed and
mortally wounded in the battle of Gettysburg .... The toll of life and limb exact-
ed... during the second decade of the twentieth century exceeds the nation's
losses in battle from the Declaration of Independence to the present day."
Significantly, since for Downey it was an "ugly fact.., that work accidents...
are due to causes inherent in mechanical industry ... and in the hereditary traits of
human nature," he saw "no prospect that the 'carnage of peace' will be terminated, as
the carnage of war may be, within the predictable future." Consequently, just as patri-
ots are fond of measuring the price of a nation's freedom in terms of battle deaths, so,
too, consumer sovereignty takes its toll: "every machine-made commodity... ha[s] a
definite cost in human blood."" To be sure, use of the term accident stands in jarring
juxtaposition to the military imagery: most soldiers are killed intentionally, not acci-
6. Guy Toscano & Janice Windau, Fatal Work Injuries: Results from the 1992 National Census,
MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, Oct. 1993, at 39, 42; COUNTING INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE
WORKPLACE: PROPOSALS FOR A BETrER SYsTEM 77-100 (Earl Pollack & Deborah Keimig ed. 1987).
All published estimates of occupational illnesses and diseases have been termed a "gross underesti-
mate." Harvey J. Hilaski, Understanding Statistics on Occupational Illnesses, MONTHLY LABOR RE-
VIEW, Mar. 1981, at 25. For an overview of the problems involved in identifying occupational diseas-
es, see PETER BARTH & H. HUNT, WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORK-RELATED ILLNESSES AND
DISEASES (1980); Rainer Mlller, A Patient in Need of Care: German Occupational Health Statistics, in
THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 127 (Paul Weindling ed. 1985); OECD, EMPLOY-
MENT OUTLOOK, July 1990, at 105-22.
7. William Krizan, Hazel Bradford, & Steven Setzer, Law of Jungle is Gaining Strength, ENR,
Jan. 31, 1994, at 70; Jon Nordheimer, Pressure of Costs Drives Some Contractors to Stress Worker
Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1993, at 25.
8. HERMAN M. SOMERS & ANNE R. SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: PREVENTION, INSUR-
ANCE, AND REHABILITATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY 6 (1954).
9. EDISON L. BOWERS, IS IT SAFE TO WORK? A STUDY OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS 1, 2 (1930).
10. E. DOWNEY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 1 (1924).
11. E. DOWNEY, HISTORY OF WORK ACCIDENT INDEMNITY IN IOWA 2-3, 4, 5 (1912).
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dentally. And the seeming inappropriateness or quasi-oxymoronic character of industri-
al battlefield rhetoric is intensified in English by the double-meaning of accident as
unexpected and unintended event on the one hand and injury on the other. But then
even between belligerents the same ambiguity attaches to casualty.2
The rhetorical support mobilized on behalf of national safety legislation in the
1960s resurrected the bloody industrial battlefield imagery of the World War I era.
Even President Nixon's new Secretary of Labor, George Shultz, soon to become a high
executive at Bechtel Corporation, the world's largest construction firm, captured "the
grim current scene" for Congress in a phrase that came to form a refrain in the ensuing
debates. 3 Accepting the figure of the National Safety Council (NSC), a private corpo-
rate accident prevention organization, that industrial accidents killed 14,000 workers
annually, Shultz remarked that: "During the last four years more Americans have been
killed where they work than in Vietnam.""'
In social or natural science investigations it is or should be methodologically
self-explanatory that before any phenomenon can be counted, it must be conceptualized
and defined. 5 To be sure, certain tricky definitional issues do exist that require clari-
fication before industrial injury fatalities can be counted, but they have largely been
resolved or at least disposed of. 6 For many decades, however, the more urgent issue
has been for the state to implement adequate injury surveillance in order to conduct an
accurate count; the resulting data could then be used for epidemiological studies on the
basis of which the state could intervene in employers' operations to impose safer
working conditions.'
This article analyzes the history of the failure to perform such an enumeration
and its consequences for the health and safety of workers in the United States. In order
to provide a more finely textured sense of the issues, throughout illustrative material is
taken from construction, one of the most dangerous industries." It remains an indus-
12. On the rhetoric of war and injury, see ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING
AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD 60-157 (1985).
13. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 38,385 (1970) (Rep. Dent); id. at 38,387 (Rep. Gaydos).
14. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1969: Hearings Before the Select Subcomm on Labor
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1969).
15. For an example of an author so intent on conceptualizing accident in terms of the "contract-
form of employment", that he loses sight of its rootedness in a profit-driven economy, see Karl Figlio,
What Is an Accident?, in THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH at 180.
16. One such question, for example, is whether deaths occurring during travel to and from work
should be included. In West Germany, for example, accidents on the way to and from work are com-
pensable but are tabulated separately; in recent years, they have accounted for about one-third of in-
dustrial fatalities. BERICHT DER BUNDESREGIERUNG OBER DEN STAND DER UNFALLVERHLTUNG UND DAS
UNFALLGESCHEHEN IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND: UNFALLVERHOTUNGSBERICHT 1991, tab. 1
at 54, tab. 3 at 56 (Bundestag Doc. 1213988, 1992). Under the "Going and Coming Rule," absent
special circumstances such as employer-provided transportation, injuries sustained while traveling to and
from work are not compensable under state workers' compensation statutes in the United States. 1
ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 15.11 at 4-3 (1992). The claim that many state
workers' compensation boards count commuting deaths as job-related is, without qualification, incorrect.
See J. Paul Leigh, Estimates of the Probability of Job-Related Death in 347 Occupations, 29 J. OCCu-
PATIONAL MED. 510 (1987). See also NIOSH, FATAL INJURIES TO WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES,
1980-1989: A DECADE OF SURVEILLANCE: NATIONAL PROFILE, App. 1 (1993) (excluding such deaths);
1 INT'L LAB. OFFICE, ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY 12-13 (1971); OECD
EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK, July 1989, at 136 (varying practices in European countries).
17. See Lawrence P. Hanrahan & Michael B. Moll, Injury Surveillance, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH,
Dec. 1989 (Supp.), at 38.
18. Early on researchers recognized that construction workers were also subject to severe occupa-
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try in which researchers seriously explore correlations between the lunar cycle and
injuries, 9 and employers are not embarrassed to say that "they're 'expected,' based
on insurance premiums, to kill three workers on a large project or that it's 'acceptable'
to have one death for every three-fourths of a mile of new tunnel completed."2
The article begins with an account of the statistical chaos and confusion engen-
dered by the murderous pace of production at the beginning of the twentieth century.
Following a survey of flawed private and government efforts to count the dead at work
since the 1920s, the focus shifts to the statistical and enforcement defects of OSHA.
After analyzing the fatality trends uncovered by the new Census and a renewed ten-
dency to divert attention from the antagonism between safety and profits, the article
concludes with a critique of one important use to which occupational fatality data have
been put--economic and legal theories that assert that workers in especially dangerous
occupations are compensated for the risks to which they are exposed.
In the Beginning was Tohu Vabohu
In the nineteenth century, what was counted was what counted .2
By the first decade of the twentieth century, observers had identified a close
relationship between the seemingly limitless expansionism of capitalism in the United
States and its merciless subordination of all activities to the criterion of profitability.
The monomaniacal drive to reduce production costs on which U.S. capital's successful
"struggle ... for international industrial supremacy" and conquest of the world market
hinged was in large part made possible by a "stupendous loss" of life.22 In 1905,
Werner Sombart, the German economic historian, according to whose most enduring
bon mot all socialist utopias in the United States foundered on "roast beef and apple
pie, ' 21 was nevertheless impressed by the tendency of unbridled capital accumulation
there to assert itself "over dead bodies. ' 24 The 75,000 railway employees killed dur-
ing the quarter-century preceding World War I was only the most vivid illustration of
the greater speed and lower level of accident prevention characteristic of U.S. enter-
prise. At the peak of this industrial slaughter, in 1907, 7,776 workers were killed on
railroads and in coal mines alone.'
tional illness and disease risks; lead poisoning, for example, was a leading cause of death among
painters. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. NO. 207: CAUSES OF DEATH
BY OCCUPATION: OCCUPATIONAL MORTALITY EXPERIENCE OF THE METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO.
INDUSTRIAL DEPARTMENT, 1911-1913, at 50-52 (1917); U.S. DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS, Bull.
No. 7: RECENT CHANGES IN THE PAINTERS' TRADE (1936) (by Alice Hamilton). On such typical
bricklayers' health problems as back injuries, see STUDENTERFRONTEN VED AARHUS UNIVERSITET,
MURERRAPPORTEN 58-69 (n.d. [ca. 19721).
19. Jimmie Hinze & Jair Roxo, Is Injury Occurrence Related to Lunar Cycles? 110 J. CONSTRUC-
TION ENGINEERING & MGMT. 409 (1984).
20. Gregg LaBar, Breaking New Ground in Construction Safety, OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS, May
1992, at 58.
21. PATRICIA C. COHEN, A CALCULATING PEOPLE: THE SPREAD OF NUMERACY IN EARLY AMERI-
CA 207 (1982).
22. C.H. Mark, Our Murderous Industrialism, 12 WORLD To-DAY 97 (1907).
23. WERNER SOMBART, WARUM GIBT ES IN DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN KEINEN SOZIALISMUS?
126 (1906).
24. Wemer Sombart, Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des nordamerikanischen Proletariats: I.
Einleitung, 21 ARCHIV FOR SOZIALWISSENSCHAFr UND SOZIALPOLITIK 210, 212 (1905).
25. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL
TIMES TO 1970, pt. 1, ser. M 271 at 607 and pt. 2, ser. Q. 404 at 740 (bicentennial ed. 1975); 2
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U.S. industry during those years "had the reputation of being the most reckless in
the world," 6 and the U.S. Department of Labor found "a frightful disregard of human
life. Accident occurrence had reached a condition not paralleled perhaps at any other
time or place."' 7 Fatality rates in U.S. coal mines were almost triple those in the Unit-
ed Kingdom and almost double those in Prussia; accident rates among U.S. railway
employees were two and one-half times as high as on the German railways.2"
In urging the adoption of injury liability and insurance legislation, Progressives
and muckrakers29 graphically portrayed the human cost of U.S. capitalism's "precious
industrial supremacy." Arthur Reeve performed the transatlantic arithmetic: every year
"the industrial Juggernaut" drew a million immigrants from Europe to maintain its
unprecedented speed, and every year the "sheer brutal carelessness ... of greedy em-
ployers," for whom "[1]aw departments and human life" were cheaper than the cost of
accident protection, killed or injured half a million.' Crystal Eastman's contribution
to The Pittsburgh Survey was a landmark account of the fatalities in heavy industry."
Upton Sinclair's depiction of the horrible ways in which industrialized slaughterhouses
killed workers as well as animals helped galvanized public opinion-if only to institute
federal meat inspection.32 In his powerful indictment, "Making Steel and Killing
Men," William Hard asked: "Must we continue to be obliged to think of scorched and
scalded human beings whenever we sit on the back platform of an observation-car and
watch the steel rails rolling out behind us?"33
Early twentieth-century labor union leaders, echoing Scientific American, under-
scored how much higher per capita industrial fatality rates were in the United States
than in Europe.' Samuel Gompers, the president of the American Federation of La-
bor, upbraiding "Moloch" for the thousands of annual sacrifices that its "industrial
slaughter" claimed,35 charged that this toll of "maimed, crippled and killed gives our
employing classes the reputation of being heartless, and even bloody." '36 And the
Federation's vice-president, John Mitchell, while conceding that the number of fatali-
ties and injuries was "not even officially counted" in the United States, nevertheless
drew from the estimates of industrial casualty rates triple those in Europe the "inevita-
ble conclusion that if it cost more to kill a workman in America than to protect him, as
it does in Europe, the American workman would not be killed, he would be protect-
HARRY A. MILLIS & ROYAL E. MONTGOMERY, THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR: LABOR'S RISKS AND
SOCIAL INSURANCE 187 (1938).
26. 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 504 (1937) (s.v. "Safety Movement");
27. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 234: THE SAFETY MOVE-
MENT IN THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY 1907 TO 1917, at 13 (1918) (written by Lucian W. Chancy
& Hugh S. Hanna).
28. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 157: INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
STATISTICS 101 (1915) (by Frederick Hoffman) (data for 1907-1912); Frederick Hoffman, Industrial
Accidents, in U.S. Bureau of Labor, BULLETIN, No. 78, Sept. 1908, at 417, 458 (data for 1897-1906).
29. See Paul Uselding, In Dispraise of the Muckrakers: United States Occupational Mortality,
1890-1910, in I RESEARCH IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 334 (Paul Uselding ed. 1976).
30. Arthur Reeves, Our Industrial Juggernaut, 16 EVERYBODY'S MAG. 147, 148 (1907).
31. CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WORK ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW (1910).
32. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906); GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A
REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916, at 98-108 (1977) (1963).
33. William Hard, Making Steel and Killing Men, 17 EVERYBODY'S MAG. 579, 581 (1907).
34. The "Casualty List" of American Industries, 96 SCI. AM. 126 (1907) (editorial).
35. Samuel Gompers, Industrial Slaughter and the "Enlightened Employers," 14 AM.
FEDERATIONIST 548, 549 (1907).
36. Samuel Gompers, The Price We Pay, 17 AM. FEDERATIONIST 665, 665 (1910).
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ed ....
A long line of observers has remarked on the extraordinary dangers of construc-
tion work in the United States, which has accounted for 15 percent of all occupational
fatalities (150,000 since 1933)-about three times the industry's share of total employ-
ment.38 The International Association of Bridge and Structural Ironworkers, for exam-
ple, reported that one per cent of its membership--109 workers-were killed in acci-
dents in fiscal year 1911-12.39 (Sixty years later the union was still losing 100 mem-
bers a year to work-related fatalities.)' At the same time, the premier construction-
engineering journal editorially conceded: "It must be frankly accepted that the most
efficient method of prosecuting work is not always the safest."' Conversely, the "safe
builder is ... put at a disadvantage in bidding .... "'
In part because the peculiar constellations of class conflict in the industrializing
societies of Western Europe had led-already in the nineteenth century to the imposition
of certain statutory-albeit often weakly enforced-duties on employers to protect their
employees from workplace dangers,"3 representatives of organized labor from other
countries were also impressed by the dearth of safety precautions in the United States.
During his visit to the United States shortly before World War I, the chairman of the
General Commission of the German Free Trade Unions noted the lack of protective
37. John Mitchell, Burden of Industrial Accidents, 38 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 76,
77, 78 (1911).
38. See e.g., NATIONAL SAFE WORKPLACE INSTITUTE, FAILED OPPORTUNITIES: THE DECLINE OF
U.S. JOB SAFETY IN THE 1980s 5-6 (1988); NATIONAL SAFE WORKPLACE INSTITUTE, UNMET NEEDS:
MAKING AMERICAN WORK SAFE FOR THE 1990s, at 9-10 (1989); R. Blake Smith, Getting to the Bot-
tom of High Accident Rates, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY, June 1993, at 34. For the underlying
employment data, see BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. -DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1865: HAND-
BOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS-REFERENCE EDITION, at 105, 118 tbls. 39, 46 (1975); EMPLOYMENT AND
EARNINGS, Dec. 1993, tab. A-25 at 37. High construction accident rates relative to those in manufac-
turing appear to be invariant in capitalist, socialist, and underdeveloped countries although the levels in
socialist countries were lower. See e.g., INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, YEAR BOOK OF LABOUR
STATISTICS, 1974, at 724-28 (1974); INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, YEAR BOOK OF LABOUR STATIS-
TICS, 997-1052 (1992).
39. LUKE GRANT, THE NATIONAL ERECTORS' ASSOCIATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOcIATION
OF BRIDGE AND STRUCTURAL IRONWORKERS 8 (Leon Stein & Philip Taft eds., Arno Press Inc. 1971)
(1915).
40. Frederick C. Klein, Ironworker Tom West Wrestles Steel Beams High Above the Ground,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1971, at 1. The membership's annual fatality rate was still close to one per
cent. For additional corroboration, see Frank S. McElroy & George R. McCormack, Injury Rates in
Construction Occupations, 1948, MONTHLY LAB. REv., March 1950, at 387, 388 (vol. 70).
41. Reducing Casualties on Construction Work, 72 ENGINEERING NEWS 145 (1914) (editorial).
42. Ethelbert Stewart, Accidents in the Construction Industry, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Jan. 1929, at
63, 65 (vol. 28).
43. The British factory acts as early as 1844 required employers to equip machines with guards.
An Act to amend the Laws relating to Labour in Factories, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 15, §§ 21, 59 (1844); An
Act to consolidate and amend the Law relating to Factories and Workshops, 41 & 42 Vict., c. 16, § 5
(1878); An Act to consolidate with Amendment the Factories and Workshop Acts, I Edw. 7, c. 22, §
10 (1901). See generally, P. BARTRIP & S. BURMAN, THE WOUNDED SOLDIERS OF INDUSTRY: INDUS-
TRIAL COMPENSATION POLICY 1833-1897, at 54-96 (1983). The Industrial Code for the North German
Confederation of 1869 obligated covered employers to provide and maintain all facilities necessary to
protect their workers against dangers to life and health. Gewerbeordnung ftr den Norddeutschen Bund,
21 June 1869, BGBI des Norddeutschen Bundes, § 107 at 270. Despite the expansive scope of this
provision, the state failed to enforce it vigorously. Lothar Machtan, Workers' Insurance Versus Protec-
tion of the Workers: State Social Policy in Imperial Germany, in THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF OCCUPA-
TIONAL HEALTH at 209. The "1891 amendments to the Industrial Code added the weasel words, "as the
nature of the operation permits." Gesetz, betreffend Abanderung der Gewerbeordnung, 1 June 1891,
RGBI, § 120a at 5.
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measures on skyscrapers, which led the industry to reckon with one death per story.
Compared with German workers, who in Carl Legien's opinion had already eliminated
the worst abuses, U.S. workers had ihe capacity to achieve much more through legisla-
tion. But "human life on the other side of the big pond is apparently given little value,
social feeling has not yet become the common good of the progressive working
class.""
Coming from the representative of a national working class that had recorded
more than 115,000 industrial fatalities during the first 18 years of operation of
Bismarck's accident insurance law, this judgment was not made lightly.45 But
Legien's observations also reflected the fact that the working class in the United States
before World War I, still "dumbfounded by the noise of production," as it were, had
not yet "come to" and initiated resistance' to the deterioration of working conditions
brought on by the task compression, deskilling, and speed-ups associated with the new
industrial drive system.4 The combined impact of labor-saving mechanization and the
massive growth of an increasingly ethnically divided labor supply resulting from the
unprecedented volume of immigration created such a large "standing army of the un-
employed" even during periods of prosperity48 that even labor unions did "not feel
strong enough to enforce demands which would involve large outlays by employers for
safe equipment and other improvements."'49
Thus of the strikes at more than 40,000 building trades establishments during the
last two decades of the nineteenth century, only one was "for better arrangements for
safety"; the comparable total among 15,000 coal and coke establishments was only
seven.' Workers and their unions had to wait more than a half-century for the kind
of federal statute that could impose national safety standards on firms and thus pre-
clude the competitive race to the bottom with which employers are wont to threaten
employees as the result of union demands for better working conditions."s In the
meantime, even for the United Mine Workers safety issues remained peripheral to
maintaining the union's strength.52
These international comparative impressionistic accounts appear to accord with
the available data. In the United Kingdom, for example, which has maintained a much
more centralized yet far from all-inclusive or uniform statistical collection system since
44. C. LEGIEN, AUS AMERIKAS ARBEITERBEWEGUNG 51, 52, 54 (1914). See also MARTIN WAG-
NER, AMERIKANISCHE BAUWIRTSCHAFT 27, 43 (1925).
45. 26 STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH FOR DAS DEUTSCHE REICH 1905, at 268 (1905) (with data for
1886 to 1903). This was the last year in which the Imperial Statistical Office printed the total of all
fatalities since the inception of the Accident Prevention Law.
46. 1 KARL MARX, DAS KAPrrAL: KRITIK DER POLISCHEN 6KONOM1E 253 (1867 & photo re-
print 1959).
47. See DAVID GORDON ELT AL., SEGMENTED WORK, DIVIDED WORKERS: THE HISTORICAL TRANS-
FORMATION OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 127-62 (1982).
48. Lorenzo Lewelling ["The Tramp Circular"], DAILY CAPITAL [Topeka], Dec. 5, 1893, reprinted
in THE POPULIST MIND 330, 331 (Norman Pollack ed. 1967) (populist governor of Kansas).
49. ISAAC A. HOURWICH, IMMIGRATION AND LABOR: THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN
IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 486 (2d ed., B.W. Huebsch, Inc. 1922) (1912).
50. SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF LABOR, 1901: STRIKES AND LOCK-
ouTs 469-74, 478-83 (1901).
51. For a sustained argument that class struggle took the form of individual litigation, see Antho-
ny F. Bale, Compensation Crisis: The Value and Meaning of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses in
the United States, 1842-1932 (1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University).
52. WILLIAM GRAEBNER, COAL-MINING SAFETY IN THE PROGRESSIVE PERIOD: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF REFORM 127-39 (1976).
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the mid-nineteenth-century,53 during the entire period from 1896 to 1991, total record-
ed construction fatalities amounted to only about 16,000 .' The construction industry
in the United States, with a population two to four times as large during the twentieth
century, may have produced fifteen to twenty times as many deaths. At the end of the
twentieth century, U.S. industrial fatality rates in general and in construction in particu-
lar remain international outliers.5
In fact, however, no one in the early twentieth century knew how many industri-
al soldiers were being mortally wounded each year in the United States. If the state
apparatus counts only what counts, then apparently "[n]o one seem[ed] to care very
much if we do kill more people in one year of peace than were slain and wounded
throughout the terrible Russo-Japanese war.' '5 6 A striking manifestation of this appar-
ent insouciance and the chief technical reason for this nescience was the lack of any
statutory obligation for employers to report workplace fatalities in any state until the
1880s; even thereafter such duties were limited and poorly enforced." The individual
state factory inspectors' reports were not only "very defective," but also so lacking in
uniformity as to "preclude[] the possibility of an accurate interstate comparison.""
Despite congressional enactments requiring railroads to report injuries to the Interstate
Commerce Commission and subjecting them to money penalties for noncompliance, 9
not even this oldest and most complete series was entirely trustworthy.'
Reeve's proposal in 1907 that the states require all accidents to be reported to
their labor bureaus and that the federal Department of Commerce and Labor process
national tabulations 61 was one whose time has still not come at the end of the century.
Bereft of a mandatory-institutionalized infrastructure, even government agencies were
53. BARTRIP & BURMAN, THE WOUNDED SOLDIERS OF INDUSTRY at 37-53 (on nineteenth-century
data collection by factory inspectors); SAFETY AND HEALTH AT WORK: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
1970-72, at 134-38, 161 (Cmnd.5034, 1972); SANDRA DAWSON ET AL., SAFETY AT WORK: THE LIMITS
OF SELF-REGULATION 27 (1988).
54. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY, BRITISH LABOUR STATISTICS: HISTORICAL
ABSTRACT 1886-1968, at 399-400 (1971) (U.K.); CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, ANNUAL ABSTRACT OF
STATISTICS 1974, No. 11, at 75 (1974) (U.K.); CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, ANNUAL ABSTRACT OF
STATISTICS 1984, No. 120, at 71 (1984) (U.K.); CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, ANNUAL ABSTRACT OF
STATISTICS 1992, No. 128, at 72 (1992) (U.K.); CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, ANNUAL ABSTRACT OF
STATISTICS 1993, No. 129, at 70 (1993) (U.K.).
55. Legislative Hearings on H.R. 1063. the Construction Safety, Health, and Education Improve-
ment Act of 1991: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and Safety of the House Comm. on Edu-
cation and Labor, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 257 (Serial No. 102-15, 1991) (testimony of Dr. Knut
Ringen); THOMAS MCGARITY & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED PROMISE OF THE
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 4-5 (1993). Since the ILO data on fatality rates
that Ringen used are based on at four different national bases (per man-hours, man-years, workers
exposed to risk, and persons employed), it is unclear how Ringen reduced them all to a per 1,000
workers common basis. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, YEAR BOOK OF LABOUR STATISTICS at
1042 (1992); INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, CURRENT INTERNATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON
LABOUR STATISTICS 1988 EDITION 101-104 (1988).
56. Reeve, supra note 30, at 147.
57. JOHN COMMONS & JOHN ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 160-63 (4th ed.
1967).
58. Hoffman, supra note 28, at 421. See generally, [NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON EMPLOY-
ERS LIABILITY], REPORT TO THE STATE OF NEW YORK: FIRST REPORT 191-93, 197 (1910); 1.
RUBINOW, SOCIAL INSURANCE: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AMERICAN CONDITIONS 49-85 (1913).
59. Act of Mar, 3, 1901, ch. 866, 31 Stat. 1446; Act of May 6, 1910, ch. 208, 36 Slat. 350.
60. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 157: INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
STATISTICS at 7.
61. Reeve, supra note 30, at 156.
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reduced to speculation. Thus the U.S. Bureau of Labor published a guesstimate based
on fragmentary data of 17,500 in 190862 followed by another of 25,000 in 1913;63 at
the same time the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations reported a figure of
35 ,000 .' Yet the following year the U.S. Commissioner of Labor Statistics readily
conceded that "[i]ndustrial accident statistics for the United States do not exist,"' and
a decade later his successor repeated the profession and laments of ignorance.'
The wave of enactments of workers' compensation legislation in about three-
fourths of the states between 1911 and U.S. entry into World War 17 should, in theo-
ry, have created a source of broad (though by no means comprehensive) and accurate
data on work-related fatalities on the basis of which prevention programs could have
been developed. Unlike the Bismarckian insurance scheme, which preceded U.S. laws
by three decades," the various state workers' compensation statutes, however, failed
to generate a nationally uniform reporting system.' Thus estimates of 10,000 to
12,000 annual fatalities for 1917 to 1919 based on aggregating state workers' compen-
sation claims were accompanied by disclaimers of inadequacy, incompleteness, and
noncomparability. °
Despite the lack of comprehensive statistics, management was well aware that
construction work, with fatality and serious injury rates running in excess of four times
those in factories, was "extra hazardous." Editorializing under the ambiguous title,
"Unwarranted Accident Waste in Construction," Engineering News-Record, the
industry's principal trade journal, observed toward the close of World War I that
"[c]asualties on the battle front in France exhibit hardly a worse record of fatalities."'"
The owner of the leading skyscraper construction firm confirmed at the end of the
boom of the 1920s that over the previous ten-year period, one steel erector died for
62. Hoffman, supra note 28, at 418.
63. Supra note 60.
64. 1 U.S. COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT AND
TESTIMONY, S. Doc. NO. 415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1916).
65. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 210 The Why and How of
Uniform Industrial Accident Statistics for the United States, 91 (written by Royal Meeker) (Proceedings
of the Third Annual Meeting of the International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Com-
missions, 1916).
66. Ethelbert Stewart, Are Accidents Increasing? MONTHLY LAB. REv., Aug. 1926, at 46-49 (vol.
23); Ethelbert Stewart, Industrial Accidents in the United States, ANNALS, Jan. 1926, at 1. See also
Leonard W. Hatch, The Problem of National Accident Statistics, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Oct. 1926, at
42-47 (vol. 23).
67. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 203: WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES, at 9, 12-13 (1917).
68. Unfallversicherungsgesetz, July 6, 1884, RGBI 69. Coverage was broad, and employers were
required to report deaths to the police; id. §§ 1, 51-52 at 69, 91. On the origins of social insurance
as an attempt to control the working class, see GASTON RIMLINGER, WELFARE POLICY AND INDUSTRI-
ALIZATION IN EUROPE, AMERICA, AND RUSSIA 112-22 (1971); HANS-ULRICH WEHLER, BISMARCK UND
DER IMPERIALISMUS 459-64 (1976 [1969]); Machtan, Workers' Insurance.
69. See 7 HANDWORTERBUCH DER STAATSWISSENSCHAFTEN 260, 285 (J. Conrad et al. 2d ed.
1901) (s.v. "Unfalistatistik" and "Unfaliversicherung"). Even the German system was not universal. See
26 STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH FOR DAS DEUTSCHE REICH 1905, at 268 n.1 (1905); Miler, A Patient in
Need of Care.
70. Margaret Gadsby, Inadequacy of Industrial Accident Statistics Published in State Reports,
MONTHLY LAB. REv., March 1921, at 167, 167-72 (vol. 12). See also BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 339: STATISTICS OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
1-8 (1923) (written by Lucian Chaney).
71. Unwarranted Accident Waste in Construction, 81 ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD 298 (1918).
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every thirty-three hours of employed time."
In the early 1920s, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), using a highly
speculative set of assumptions, estimated annual industrial fatalities at 30,039." This
pseudo-precision did not mislead the Secretary of Labor, who noted in his annual
report, that "[i]t is not greatly to the credit of our people that nobody knows... even
the annual number of industrial fatalities."'4 The lack of federal regulation or over-
sight of working conditions before the New Deal was in large part responsible for the
lack of any nationally uniform labor statistics.75 In order to make a small start toward
abating this ignorance-an initiative that did not even rise to the level of government
information-gathering as an aid to legislation' 6-bills were filed in both houses of
Congress in 1926 to establish a division of safety within the BLS to collect and ana-
lyze data on industrial accidents "with special reference to their causes, effects, and
occupational distribution."" The chief sponsor in the House of Representatives, con-
tinuing the tradition of military metaphors, suggested "that many great battles of the
world have not caused so many casualties as perhaps one year of industry in the Unit-
ed States."' 8 That the bill was never enacted and the division of safety therefore not
created can in part be accounted for by the dizzy-with-success free enterprise of the
1920s, legislatively embodied by Senator Hiram Bingham. A former history professor
at Yale and governor of Connecticut, he contended that workers' compensation statutes
had literally eliminated all problems:
[I]n Connecticut . . . [w]e passed an employer's liability compensation act, which
requires all employers ... to see to it that their employees should be protected at
work. Now, this had the very natural effect of making the manufacturers do what
they should have done before, look into the causes of their own accidents and
guard against them. [T]his is the proper theory of government, to put on the indi-
vidual the initiative of seeing to it that he corrects his own errors, rather than to
have the Government tell him what he must do in order to correct them, and that is
the reason, I take it, why we do not find it necessary to collect accident statistics
any more; it is because the workmen are protected, and the manufacturers them-
selves are seeing to it that they can and do establish the very latest form of safety
devices, for their own protection, and for the saving in insurance, and for the safety
of their workers.
72. W. STARRETr, SKYSCRAPERS AND THE MEN WHO BUILD THEM 301 (1928).
73. Carl Hookstadt, Estimated Annual Number and Cost of Industrial Accidents in the United
States, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Nov. 1923, at 1, 6 tbl. 4 (vol. 17). These figures included all gainfully
employed persons; among employees, fatalities totaled 21,232.
74. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR FOR
THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1923, at 59 (1923). See also Charles H. Verrill, Industrial Acci-
dent and Compensation Statistics, 12 AM. ECON. REV. 137 (Supp. 1922).
75. JOSEPH DUNCAN & WILLIAM SHELTON, REVOLUTION IN UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT STATIS-
TICS: 1926-1976, at 18 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1978); LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE STATISTI-
CAL WORK OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 132-37 (1925).
76. For a typology of arguments in favor of government data collecting, see Steven Kelman, The
Political Foundations of American Statistical Policy, in THE POLITICS OF NUMBERS 275, 280-93 (Wil-
liam Alonso & Paul Starr eds. 1987).
77. Division of Safety: Hearings on H.R. 11886 Before the House Committee on Labor, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1926).
78. Id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Rathbone).
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The thing works out there in the proper way.'
Such market-knows-best anti-patemalism' carried the day during the "New
Capitalism" of the Republican ascendancy, prefiguring the emergence of an
econometrically sophisticated market-inspired critique of state intervention a half-centu-
ry later." Senator Bingham's opposition ultimately caused the bill to fail, but even
business knew better than to trust such mechanistic wishful thinking. 2 Thus at the
height of the boom, just days before the stock market crash, William Wheeler, one of
construction management's safety spokesmen, observed that "[t]his human sacrifice,
chargeable to the industry, is unnecessary and avoidable." However,
"[hjumanitarianism is not required to tell contractors what to do when an economic
need, rather an economic justification for it, is clearly shown." That economic basis
was simply that "the industry pays altogether too large an accident bill which repre-
sents pure waste of productive capital." Yet in trying to identify the financial incen-
tives that would motivate construction firms to pursue safety measures, Wheeler speci-
fied for the Annual Safety Congress of the National Safety Council (NSC) how "all
accidents are 'caused"':
Progressive and successful contractors... have learned that the most important
thing in the building industry is time; that material and men must be kept moving
without loss of time if a building is to be ready on the contemplated date; and also,
that all of their equipment, labor and capital must be used all of the time if maxi-
mum profits are to be counted. The tenor of the present day building business is
unrelenting competition, fast production with rising pressure upon personnel and
equipment. This is a fast moving era and speed is its urge. The business of today
that succeeds must move fast ......
Wheeler was merely localizing in construction the larger truth about the "Penalty
the American Nation Pays for Speed."" The BLS agreed that the fact that "[b]oth
contractor and owner are apt to be anxious to push the job with all practicable speed"
was among the factors "cons-pir[ing] to render difficult the task of securing a reason-
able degree of safety." 5 Unsurprisingly, then, in the depths of the Great Depression,
the National Conference on Construction, through its Committee on Elimination of
Waste and Undesirable Practices, conceded that "the industry has no practical plan for
accident prevention" despite the fact that knowledge of "the real causes of the acci-
dents" was available.
86
Despite the carnage that capital in construction and elsewhere was leaving in its
79. To Create a Division of Safety in the Department of Labor: Hearings on S. 3983 Before the
Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1926).
80. Id. at 39, 45.
81. See, e.g., ROBERT S. SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT (1976).
82. 68 CONG. REC. 5030 (1927); see also id. at 1015-18; S. REP. No. 1288, 69th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1927).
83. William Wheeler, Results Through Voluntary Cooperation in Accident Prevention in Construc-
tion, reprinted in 1929 TRANSACTION S OF THE NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL: EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL
SAFETY CONGRESS 1:650, 655 (1929) (executive secretary of the Committee on Accident Prevention of
the Building Trades Employers' Association of the City of New York).
84. Harry Mock, Penalty the American Nation Pays for Speed, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Oct. 1927,
at 55 (vol. 25).
85. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. NO. 425: RECORD OF INDUSTRI-
AL ACCIDENTS IN THE UNrrED STATES TO 1925, at 104 (1927).
86. NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CONSTRUCTION, REPORTS: GENERAL MEETING, pt. 13 at 3 (1932).
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wake, data remained sparse. Echoing complaints that it had already voiced during the
heady 1920s,' the BLS acknowledged at the beginning of the New Deal that:
Accurate information on industrial injuries in the United States is unfortu-
nately not available. Not only is it impossible to determine with any degree of
accuracy the causes of accidents, the nature of the injuries, the extent of the dis-
abilities, the number of workers handicapped through injury, or the cost in time or
money lost through industrial injuries, but even the most elementary part of infor-
mation relating to industrial injuries-the total number of disabling injuries sus-
tained by industrial workers within a given year-is not available for the country as
a whole.
It would seem to be a rather simple matter to determine the number of fatal
and nonfatal industrial injuries in each State and combine these in a complete tabu-
lation. This, has, however, not been possible, partly through lack of reporting in
States which have not adopted workmen's compensation laws or from industries
not covered by the law in other States."8
By the end of the 1930s, when construction was "by far the most hazardous"
industry, 9 the BLS may still not have had precise figures, but it knew enough to add
a new twist to the rhetoric of bellum accidentum: "The number of workers killed at
their jobs during 1937 was more than 4 times the number of soldiers killed during the
entire Revolutionary War.""
The National Safety Council: "Safety First"-and Accuracy Last 1
There is no step, no forward step made by what we call the proletariat, the
working population, against the power-holding class except in one way ....
[Oirganized labor, the organized proletariat, the organized-whatever you may
please to call it-has never won a substantial victory over that power-holding class,
except in one way, and that is upon the Christian or moral right, and that can lick
the hard boiled and the standpatters. 2
In the absence of any general-purpose national industrial safety and health legis-
lation, the federal government lacked an institutionalized inspection, enforcement, or
insurance compensation basis for generating statistics. In this statutory vacuum it was
only appropriate that laissez faire guided data collection as well as the labor market.
As a symbolic remnant of the divergent national paths to industrial injury prevention,
the Statistical Abstract of the United States continues to report the number of "workers
87. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 490: STATISTICS OF INDUS-
TRIAL ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES TO THE END OF 1927, at 1-10 (1929).
88. Industrial Injuries in the United States, 1917 to 1932, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Apr. 1934, at
1093, 1094 (vol. 38).
89. Max D. Kossoris & Swen Kjaer, Industrial Injuries in the United States During 1936,
MONTHLY LAB. REv., Jan. 1938, at 18 (vol. 47).
90. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. NO. 667: MANUAL ON INDUS-
TRIAL INJURY STATISTICS 1 (1940).
91. On the NSC's ambivalence toward the slogan, see Dianne Bennett & William Graebner, Safety
First: Slogan and Symbol of the Industrial Safety Movement, 68 J. ILL. STATE HIST. SOC'Y 243, 255-
56 (1975).
92. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 304: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARDS
AND COMMISSIONS 63 (1922) (discussion contribution by A. J. Pillsbury, Comm'r, Cal. Indus. Accident
Comm'n).
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killed" in the section headed, "Labor Force, Employment, and Earnings,"" whereas
the corresponding statistical compendia in Europe place these data under such rubrics
as "Public Health," "Insurance," or "Social Conditions."'
Consistent with the voluntary character of the U.S. approach, from the 1930s
until the enactment of OSHA, the generation of data on employment-related fatalities
largely rested with a private organization, the NSC, which compiled such statistics as
part of its overall "Safety First" accident prevention program. The NSC was chartered
by an act of Congress in 1953, 95 four decades after it emerged from efforts by the-
murderous steel industry to manage its casualties and by big business in general to
ward off even more costly and less predictable injury indemnification systems than
workers' compensation laws.' For many years, the NSC has been the key organiza-
tion in a private network designed to enable employers to preempt state intervention by
voluntarily formulating and adopting their own safety and health standards. As "a
captive of its member firms ... it function[s] as a public relations agency and corpo-
rate think tank rather than an independent research body. [Tlhe NSC develop[s] and
promote[s] preventive strategies that coincide[] with corporate control of production,
personnel relations, and plant operations."'91
The NSC based (and continues to base) its estimates of industrial fatality on
death certificates compiled by the National Center for Health Statistics and annual
reports by state registrars of vital statistics. Although death certificates "in theory"
contain the information required to categorize all fatalities into the four classes (motor
vehicle, work, home, and public) which form the NSC's universe of accidental death,
"[i]n practice ... missing or incompletely coded information prevents the direct use of
death certificate data for determining the class totals" other than motor vehicles.9"
Moreover, the death certificates do not specify the industries in which the deaths oc-
curred. In order to rectify this defect:
From the late 1930's to the mid-60's a statistician from the Council would go to
Washington in January or February of each year to meet with statisticians at...
93. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1992, tbl. 665 at 419 (112th ed. 1992) (using NSC estimates). When the Census Bureau began pub-
lishing the BLS injury rates, it classified them among "labor force" data. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CEN-
SUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrED STATES: 1944-45, tbl. 172 at 171 (1945).
94. See, e.g., MINISTPRE DU TRAVAIL, ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE-1922, at 149 (1923); CENTRAL
STATISTICAL OFFICE, ANNUAL ABSTRACT OF STATISTICS 1992, tbl. 3.35 at 72; STATISTISCHES
BUNDESAMT, STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH 1976 FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, tbl. 21.3.2 at
389 (1976); STATISTISK CENTRALBYRA, STATISTISK ARBOK 1991, tbl. 136 at 116 (1991); STATISTISKA
CENTRALBYRAN, STATISTISK ARBOK FOR SVERIGE 1991, tbl. 370 at 323 (1991); BUNDESAMT FUR
STATISTIK, STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH DER SCHWEIZ 1991, tbl. 13.9 at 262 (1990).
95. Act of Aug. 13, 1953, Pub. L. No. 259, 67 Stat. 569. This federal charter does not affect the
NSC's nongovernmental status.
96. See Don D. Lescohier, Working Conditions, in 3 HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES,
1896-1932, at 1, 366-70 (1935); DAVID BRODY, STEELWORKERS IN AMERICA: THE NONUNION ERA
164-68 (1960); Lawrence Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Acci-
dents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967); JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL
STATE: 1900-1918, at 40-61 (1968); DAVID NOBLE, AMERICA BY DESIGN: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND
THE RISE OF CORPORATE CAPITALISM 289-92 (1977).
97. CHARLES NOBLE, LIBERALISM AT WORK: THE RISE AND FALL OF OSHA 43-45 (1986). See
also JOSEPH PAGE & MARY-WIN O'BRIEN, BITTER WAGES: RALPH NADER'S STUDY GROUP REPORT
ON DISEASE AND INJURY ON THE JOB 149-65 (1973); DANIEL BERMAN, DEATH ON THE JOB: OCCUPA-
TIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY STRUGGLES IN THE UNITED STATES 74-81 (1978).
98. NSC, ACCIDENT FACTS, 1993 EDITION, at 112.
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BLS ... and other federal agencies collecting accident-related data. Together they
would go over the latest information from BLS surveys, Council estimates, reports
from Council members, and special studies, and they would agree on the work
death total that both agencies would use. They would also agree on the distribution
of those deaths among the major industry groups."
The only light that the NSC chooses to shine into this densely black methodolog-
ical box is a table showing what was apparently the last "reconciliation" between the
NSC and the BLS in 1964. For the construction industry, where non-employees ac-
counted for between a quarter and a fifth of all fatalities, the data were based on
"small sample surveys" conducted by the BLS."m If this procedure was murky and
suspected of including duplicate deaths, which rendered both absolute levels and year-
to-year changes unreliable,' °' since the mid-1960s, when the BLS ceased furnishing
the NSC with the annual benchmarks derived from BLS surveys, it has become impen-
etrable. This incomprehensibility is only enhanced by the procedure that the NSC
devised to "allocate" deaths to the three non-motor vehicle classes. Called "the 3-Way
Split," it applies a "set of allocation factors" to each combination of age-group and
external cause of death derived from a survey of death certificates; developed in the
1930s, these factors were based on documentation which is no longer available to the
NSC, although it asserts that a recent revision did not call for a re-estimation of total
workplace deaths. 2
The following colloquy between the president of the NSC and Harrison Wil-
liams, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, inadver-
tently highlighted the NSC's opaque methodology:
The CHAIRMAN. You have some statistics here that we have been unable to
get on the ... numbers of deaths due to accident. Where do you get your statis-
tics? The Labor Department doesn't have them?
Mr. TOFANY. We get them from a variety of sources including the agencies
of the Federal Government and private sector organizations, also from our own
members. Our statisticians take these sources and the data that flows from them
and correlate them. For example, the total number of deaths that happened into
[sic] the country are broken down into categories as to cause of death. And to the
extent they can apply that information, that works its way into the conclusions our
statisticians reach.
Thus, we have a wide variety of sources which we utilize to the extent that
we can in order to develop the relationship of all of the data as it relies to a given
accident area where we don't have the specific report, per se, and then 103
99. NSC, DOCUMENTATION OF NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL STATISTICS DEPARTMENT ESTIMATING
PROCEDURES FOR MOTOR-VEHICLE, WORK, HOME, AND PUBLIC DEATHS AND DEATH RATES 2, 7-8
(Feb. 1982).
100. NSC, supra note 99, at 8, Appendix 8.
101. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PREVENTING ILLNESS AND INJURY IN
THE WORKPLACE 31 (1985).
102. NSC, ACCIDENT FACTS, 1993 EDITION, at 112-13; [Stephanie Brand & Alan Hoskin], "Alloca-
tion Factor Investigation' (n.d. [1993]). See also U.S. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.,
ANALYSIS OF CONSTRUCTION FATALITIES-THE OSHA DATA BASE 1985-1989, at 75 (1990) ("Although
the same equations are still used, the original data giving the rationale is no longer available").
103. Occupational Safety and Health Act Review, 1974: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 92-93 (1974).
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One reason that Williams, arguably the staunchest congressional advocate of
labor-protective legislation during the post-World War II period, failed to challenge or
even to remark on this double talk may have been that the NSC's high industrial fatali-
ty figures provided ongoing justification for strengthening OSHA."° Although the
BLS, in compliance with the Secretary of Labor's statutory duty to develop injury
statistics under OSHA, began to operate under a scope of coverage and definitions
which were incompatible with the NSC's, and despite the lack of any "other direct
measures of fatality experience," the NSC has "continued to carry forward these esti-
mates." For public consumption, the NSC contends "that this procedure is the most
satisfactory now available."'" Privately, however, the manager of the NSC's statistics
department concedes that the NSC's annual estimates, cut off from periodic
benchmarking, began to "deviate from reality" by the end of the 1970s. Moreover, the
NSC continues to publish data on absolute levels of fatalities without caveats although
the data for at least the last three decades reflect only year-to-year changes."
This bewildering methodology is all the more bizarre given the NSC's eminently
practical purposes as "the leader of the voluntary safety movement, integrating the
views'of management, labor, government, and the general public." After all, in order to
spotlight growing problems and to deemphasize sources of accidents of decreasing
importance, the NSC depends on "complete, consistent, comparable, unbiased, and
current" data, which it contends are available through selection of sources and proce-
dures that "maximize" such reliability."° The NSC's continued dissemination of data
based on statistical adjustments that became obsolete almost three decades ago calls
into question its claim that "[c]redibility" is one of its "hallmarks."'" Similarly, the
NSC's nonfatal injury statistics, collected voluntarily from member firms, are biased
because those self-reporting firms compete for safety awards based on their own da-
ta.1
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Despite their manifest defects, the NSC data remain the only long-term compre-
hensive series, and retain their political value as having furnished the most impressive
statistical support that proponents of OSHA could muster. The NSC figures were, for
example, the source of the congressional testimony by the president of the AFL-CIO
Building and Construction Trades Department that more than 25,000 building trades-
men had been killed on the job during the 1960s."0 Congress was also animated by
the NSC's overall estimates of 2.2 million disabling injuries annually-which may
have represented only one-fifth of the actual number"'-and more than 14,000
104. The NSC submitted a written supplement to its testimony to the committee, which merely
stated that whereas the NSC "precisely tabulated" motor-vehicle deaths, it did not do so with regard to
work, home, or public fatalities; it failed to explain its method for "estimating what the counts should
be." Occupational Safety and Health Act Review, 1974, supra note 103, at 909, 910.
105. NSC, supra note 99, at 8.
106. Telephone interview with Alan Hoskin, NSC, Itasca, IL (Feb. 11, 1994, 11:00 a.m.). BERMAN,
supra note 97, at 39, inverts the absurdity of the procedure by charging that the absolute figures
"were given a spurious appearance of accuracy by the inclusion of annual percentage changes."
107. NSC, supra note 99, at 1.
108. Untitled and undated information sheet distributed by the NSC.
109. JEROME GORDON ET AL., INDUSTRIAL SAFETY STATISTICS: A RE-ExAMINATION 189-90 (1971).
110. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 1970: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, pt. 2, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1113 (1970).
111. NICHOLAS ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE: OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND INJURY 46
(1976). For alternative injury rate statistics showing a stable or declining trend in the pre-OSHA peri-
od, see W. VISCUSi, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE 28-31
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Table 1: Workers Kifled in the United States, 1928-1992 (NSC)t
Year Total Construction Year j Total Construction
1928 19000 2600 1961 13500 2300
1929 20000 NA 1962 13700 2400
1930 19000 NA 1963 14200 2500
1931 17500 NA 1964 14200 2600
1932 15000 1800 1965 14100 2700
1933 14500 2300 1966 14500 2800
1934 16000 2300 1967 14200 2700
1935 16500 2500 1968 14300 2800
1936 18500 2800 1969 14300 2800
1937 19000 3100 1970 13800 2800
1938 16000 2700 1971 13700 2700
1939 15500 1800 1972 14000 2800
1940 17000 3100 1973 14300 2800
1941 18000 3300 1974 13500 2600
1942 18000 3100 1975 13000 2300
1943 17500 2400 1976 12500 2100
1944 16000 1800 1977 12900 2400
1945 16500 1700 1978 13100 2600
1946 16500 2200 1979 13000 2600
1947 17000 2400 1980 13200 2500
1948 16000 2500 1981 12500 2300
1949 15000 2100 1982 11900 2100
1950 15500 2300 1983 11700 2100
1951 16000 2500 1984 11500 2200
1952 15000 2400 1985 11500 2200
1953 15000 2500 1986 11100 2100
1954 14000 2400 1987 11300 2200
1955 14200 2500 1988 11000 2200
1956 14300 2600 1989 10900 2100
1957 14200 2500 1990 10100 2100
1958 13300 2400 1991 9300 1800
1959 13800 2500 1992 8500 1300
1960 13800 2400
fatalities,' which may have been an overestimate. The role played by the NSC's da-
ta is ironic"' in light of Ralph Nader's allegations at the 1969 OSHA hearings that
(1983).
t Sources: Construction 1928: R. Fortney & Alvan Battey, Where the Fatalities Occurred in
1929, NAT'L SAFETY NEWS, Feb. 1931, at 23, 24; Total 1928-1992: NSC, ACCIDENT FACTS 1993
EDITON 26-27 (1993); Construction 1933-1992: NSC, ACCIDENT FACTS (annually, 1933-1993)
112. NSC, ACCIDENT FACTS, 1973 EDmON 28 (1973).
113. For a (not very persuasive) explanation of a similar statistically inaccurate statement against
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the NSC's injury frequency data are "widely recognized as incomplete, often inaccu-
rate, and always unverified" and that "[t]he record of the National Safety Council is
impressive in terms of misrepresenting the true' safety record of its own members." 4
The NSC series reveals an astounding total of 862,900 killed during the six
decades from 1932 to 1992, 147,400 of whom worked in construction (table 1). More-
over, for the forty-five years following World War II, construction fatalities showed a
stubbornly irreducible floor: from 1946 to 1990, annual fatalities moved within a very
narrow range, never falling below 2,100 or rising above 2,800. This constancy may,
however, at least since OSHA's enactment, have been a mere statistical artifact-a
function of the fact that NSC has continued to moor its fatality data to an obsolete
BLS benchmark. Among the 265,000 workers killed even under the aegis of OSHA,
the 50,000 deaths in the construction industry figured prominently.
Joint Private-Public Underestimates
Death entails a total cessation of labor power .... '
The BLS, too, published survey-based fatality data from 1936 on although the
samples outside of manufacturing, mining, and railroads were so fragmentary that the
BLS itself did not regard them as "satisfactorily representative." In construction, for
example, the BLS went through the motions of extrapolating totals from a mere 148
establishments "because so little information is available ... from any other source
and ... injury hazards ... are known to be great."".6 The BLS gradually enlarged
the samples, and as of 1937 began including self-employeds." 7 Exactly how it col-
lected these sample data the BLS failed to reveal. It appears that until 1938, the BLS
obtained the data from state workers' compensation boards, whereas from 1939 on it
effected "a drastic change" by switching to voluntary direct reporting by employ-
ers.1 ' Which source generated more underreporting the BLS did not note or perhaps
even examine. By the early post-World War II period, fewer than a third of the con-
struction firms from which the BLS requested data filed usable reports." 9 Such self-
selection may well have resulted in undersampling of employers with the worst safety
records and thus in underestimates of total fatalities.
These sampling problems notwithstanding, the BLS data appear in fact to have
derived at least in part from the NSC tabulations although the BLS did not always
make this connection clear. On the one hand, the BLS stated that its work-injury data
interest-namely, Census Bureau data showing stagnation in real family income during the 1970s-see
Christopher Jencks, The Politics of Income Measurement, THE POLITICS OF NUMBERS 83, 126-31 (Wil-
liam Alonso & Paul Starr eds. 1987).
114. Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1970: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, Pt. 1 at 630.
115. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 276: STANDARDIZATION OF
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT STATISTICS 73 (1920).
116. Max Kossoris & Swen Kjaer, Industrial Injuries in the United States During 1936, MONTHLY
LAB. REV., Oct. 1938, at 18, 26 (vol. 47).
117. Max Kossoris & Swen Kjaer, Industrial Accidents in the United States During 1937, MONTH-
LY LAB. REV., Oct. 1939, at 597, 599 (vol. 48).
118. Max Kossoris & Swen Kjaer, Industrial Injuries in the United States During 1939, MONTHLY
LAB. REV., Oct. 1940, at 86, 89 (vol. 49).
119. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1004: WORK INJURIES IN
CONSTRUCTION, 1948-49, at 2-3 (1950).
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were based on survey samples of voluntarily participating employers "computed by
direct expansion to represent the probable volume of injuries in the total working pop-
ulation."'" On the other hand, these data "also served the important internal function
of supporting the estimates" of annual fatalities,' which, especially in the post-
World War II years, were the same as the NSC's figures." In 1951, the BLS re-
vealed that since these estimates were "prepared cooperatively" by the two organiza-
tions, they were "identical."'" As the U.S. Commissioner of Labor Statistics ex-
plained to the President's Conference on Occupational Safety in 1954 in a "quasi-dra-
matic presentation," because the BLS "cannot obtain anywhere a complete count of
work injuries ... the technical people" at the BLS and NSC "assemble all of these
bits and pieces of work-injury data, fit them together like pieces in a jigsaw puzzle...
match them up ... and make adjustments so that the figures will be comparable."''
In 1966, shortly before the BLS broke off its cooperation with the NSC, it pub-
lished its first Handbook of Methods, which managed to be almost as cryptic about
their joint estimation procedures as the NSC. The annual data
represent the combined judgment of the technical staffs of the two organizations
based on a pooling of all data available to either group.
In the absence of a centralized system of reporting work injuries in the Unit-
ed States, the accumulation of data providing national totals must be based upon
the assembly of a many bits of data drawn from a wide variety of sources. These
basic data frequently overlap or omit entirely certain segments of employment.
Additional problems are introduced by a lack of uniformity in the reporting and
compilation procedures of the organizations from which the basic data are ob-
tained.'"
After obliquely conceding that its methods could not be reproduced, checked, or
verified, the BLS identified state workers' compensation agencies as the primary data
sources although they failed to "meet current needs" because of variations in coverage
and inadequate statistical procedures. The BLS therefore had recourse to organizations
as heterogeneous as the Coast Guard and the Portland Cement Association to fill in the
gaps. Ultimately, only the data for mining, manufacturing, and railroads were deemed
,'very comprehensive and ... having a high degree of accuracy," whereas those for
agriculture were "fragmentary ... and may reflect a comparatively high degree of
error."
12
120. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1016: HANDBOOK OF LA-
BOR STATISTICS, 1950 EDITION 175 (1951).
121. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEFT. OF LABOR, BULL. NO. 1458: HANDBOOK OF
METHODS FOR SURVEYS AND STUDIES 205 (1966).
122. See, e.g., BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 916: HANDBOOK
OF LABOR STATISTICS, 1947 EDmON, tbl. G-2 at 164 (1948); NSC, ACCIDENT FACTS, 1973 EDITION
at 29; supra tbl. 1. Neither the BLS nor NSC explained why their fatality figures diverged for several
years.
123. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. NO. 1025: WORK INJURIES IN
THE UNITED STATES DURING 1949, at I n.3 (1951).
124. U.S. Bureau of Labor Standards, Bull. 175: THE PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE ON OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY: PROCEEDINGS MAY 4-6, 1954, at 7-8 (1954) (Ewan Clague).
125. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF METHODS FOR SUR-
VEYS AND STUDIES 205.
126. Id. at 205, 206. From several statements it is possible to surmise that the fatality figures were
not enumerations at all but merely derived from some observed patterns of deaths as a share of all
injuries. Thus the BLS spoke in several places of the data as "the percent of disabling injuries result-
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The preceding historical sketch of BLS-NSC cooperation with regard to the
creation of industrial accident fatality data should be viewed in the context of the
nationally uniform method that the BLS and employers jointly adopted in the 1930s for
recording and reporting work injuries. Like the NSC-BLS methodology for fatal inju-
ries, the American Standard Method of Measuring and Recording Work Injury Experi-
ence of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) failed to create accurate data
on nonfatal injuries. The ANSI Z16.1 standard inevitably underestimated injuries by
excluding from the definition of the "day of disability" the day of injury and the day
on which the injured worker returned to full-time work. This distortion, which vitiated
all BLS injury data from the 1930s until the enactment of OSHA in 1970, was com-
pounded by a system of voluntary reporting, which presumably biased the sample
toward firms with low rates.12 These methodological machinations formed the basis
of Ralph Nader's charge at the OSHA hearings in 1969 that in the 1930s the BLS
began intentionally to understate nonfatal accidents by acquiescing in industry's request
that certain injuries be excluded and the sample be kept statistically insignificant in
order to minimize the visibility of safety problems and industry's responsibility for
them.' Under the more comprehensive OSHA standard, however, which includes
injuries that require medical treatment beyond first aid but do not involve lost work-
days, the number of recorded occupational injuries and illnesses more than tripled. 2 9
The State Counts Too
The Bureau of Labor Statistics at the request of OSHA doesn't know what the hell
is going on .... We don't know how many people get killed in construction,
much less injured, ill or otherwise."
For the period since the enactment of OSHA, the BLS has issued an alternative
series of annual "industrial battle bulletins, which enumerate the wounded and killed of
the industrial army."'' These data were, at least until the advent of the Census of
Fatal Occupational Injuries for 1992, the quasi-official figures, which were included in
the annual report which OSHA requires the President to transmit to Congress.'32 The
ing in death, permanent impairment, and temporary-total disability." Id. at 197; see also id. at 198,
204.
127. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA STANDARDS INSTITUTE, USA STANDARD METHOD OF RECORDING
AND MEASURING WORK INJURY EXPERIENCE 8 (1967), reprinted in Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 1970: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Wel-
fare, pt. 2 at 1181; COUNTING INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE WORKPLACE at 12-13; Lyle Schauer &
Thomas Ryder, New Approach to Occupational Safety and Health Statistics, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr.
1972, at 14 (vol. 95).
128. Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1970: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, pt. 1 at 628.
129. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1798: OCCUPATIONAL INJU-
RIES AND ILLNESSES BY INDUSTRY: JULY I-DECEMBER 31, 1971, at 25, 31 (1973); NSC, ACCIDENTS
FACTS, 1973 EDITION 33.
130. Construction Safety, Health and Education Improvement Act of 1989: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (1989) (testimony of Barry
Cole, manager, construction safety consulting firm). This ignorance did not prevent Senator Dodd from
calculating at the same hearing that "every 2 hours, three construction workers" are killed. Id. at 2.
131. 3 KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL: KRITIK DER POLITISCHEN OKONOMIE, in 25 KARL MARX [&]
FRIEDRICH ENGELS, WERKE 99 (1967).
132. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 1975, tab. 14 at
108 (1979). The statutory authority is at 29 U.S.C. § 675 (1988).
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data that the BLS has collected for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
("OSHAdm") since the second half of 1971 are based on mail surveys of covered em-
ployers. Firms, which have no legal duty to respond, report the recordable injuries and
illnesses-fatalities, other lost workday cases, and non-lost workday cases resulting in
"transfer to another job or termination of employment," or involve "loss of conscious-
ness or restriction of work or motion" 33-that they are statutorily required to enter
into their OSHA logs, although one-quarter fail to comply with that obligation or
underrecord and underreport injuries."
The BLS itself has obliquely pointed to the key weakness of its data collection
procedure-namely, that the logs "reflect the year's injury and illness experience, and
also the employer's understanding of the types of cases to record under current
recordkeeping guidelines.""13 Yet in order to preserve confidentiality and maintain
voluntary participation, the BLS neither validates these reports at the workplace nor
shares them with the OSHAdm for inspection and compliance purposes."3 The
BLS's sampling system of unmonitored employer self-reporting prompted occupational
medicine and public health scholars to criticize the Bureau's single-source-generated
fatality figures as "grossly underreported." '137
An effective health and safety surveillance program would encompass mass
processing and auditing of the logs by the OSHAdm on a scale at least comparable to
the Internal Revenue Service's treatment of self-reported income tax forms. But just as
Congress has provided for checks on taxpayer truthfulness by requiring employers,
banks, and other payors to file corroborating forms, mandating joint maintenance of
the logs by unions or other worker representatives would reduce the frequency of self-
serving understatements by employers. The effectiveness of the resulting set of accu-
rate statistics would also be significantly enhanced if they were published for each
firm '3 so that current and prospective employees would at least have the requisite
information for making rational decisions as to where to work, how high their wages
should be, and whether changes in working conditions are appropriate.
OSHA, however, is merely a mandatory recordkeeping, not a mandatory report-
ing system.'39 Indeed, so far removed is OSHA from such a strict regime that an em-
ployer, whose only obligation is to make the logs available to the Department of Labor
on request, 140  can-without being sanctioned for filing a frivolous
claim '4 -judicially challenge the Department's power even to inspect those logs. 42
133. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.12(c) (1993).
134. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.2(a) (1993); Paul Seligman et al., Compliance with OSHA Record-keeping
Requirements, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1218 (1988); U.S. GAO, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH:
ASSURING ACCURACY IN EMPLOYER INJURY AND ILLNESS RECORDS 3 (1988).
135. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. 'No. 2399: OCCUPATIONAL INJU-
RIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE UNITED STATES BY INDUSTRY, 1990, at 1 (1992) (italics added).
136. Eileen McNeely, Who's Counting Anyway? The Problem with Occupational Safety and Health
Statistics, 33 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 1071 (1991).
137. Anthony Suruda & Edward Emmett, Counting Recognized Occupational Deaths in the United
States, 30 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 868 (1988).
138. See 2 WOLFGANG DAUBLER, DAS ARBEITSRECHT: EIN LEITFADEN FOR ARBEITNEHMER 127
(1979).
139. While continuing to acknowledge BLS's need for confidentiality, the OSHA has proposed
moving in the direction of having employers make the logs available to the OSHA and the public.
U.S. GAO, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH: CHANGES NEEDED IN THE COMBINED FEDERAL-
STATE APPROACH 36, 69 (1994); DAILY LAB. REP., Mar, 23, 1994 (Lexis).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 657(c) (1) (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 1904.7(a) (1993).
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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Moreover, a change in the OSHAdm's enforcement policy gave manufacturing em-
ployers a considerable incentive to underreport injuries on their logs. Beginning in
1981, OSHAdm inspectors terminated on-site general schedule (random) inspections as
soon as they determined, based on the employer's logs, that the firm's lost work-day
injury rate (excluding fatal injuries) was lower than the national average for manufac-
turing. 43 Such underreporting of lost workdays stems from the widespread practice
among employers of "keeping 'the walking wounded' on the job," which less than
subtly informs workers that "non-lost-time accidents and first aid accidents are expect-
ed" as a matter of course."
The close connection between conceptually deficient accident/injury statistics and
prevention is captured by the incompatibility between the construction industry's pro-
grammatic approach to safety and OSHA's data reporting system. The Associated
General Contractors of America, a large trade organization, made this commonsensical
observation in its construction accident prevention manual almost seventy years ago:
"An accident is an unintentional interruption to an orderly process-a turning aside of
an intended procedure. The injury to persons is only the evidence of an accident."' 45
Yet under OSHA, employers are not required to report even major accidents provided
that no one is injured." The absurdity of this type of nonreporting was underscored
when twenty-eight construction workers died in 1987 as a result of a building collapse
in Bridgeport, Connecticut. The same firm that was building L'Ambiance Plaza had
previously built Metro Center, thirty miles away, which also collapsed, but because
only one worker suffered an injury-the threshold for reporting within 48 hours is a
fatality or five injuries'" 7-the firm was not required to report it.' If OSHAdm
had been notified of this previous major construction failure, "we're pretty certain that
L'Ambiance never would have occurred."' 149
For the period July 1, 1971 through 1991, the BLS-OSHA series estimated a
total of 88,430 fatalities (table 2)."S This figure significantly understated workplace
deaths because after 1977 the BLS published fatality data only for establishments with
eleven or more employees.' The BLS limited the scope of the survey because it re-
duced the sample by 85,000 "in response to the Presidential directive on reduction of
the paperwork burden in survey operations. The sample reduction results in larger
142. See, e.g., Dole v. Trinity Industries, 904 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1990).
143. OSHA Enforcement Policy: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1983) (statement of Thorne Auchter, ass't sec'y of labor for
OSH); COUNTING INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE WORKPLACE at 47-48, 111-12; LAWRENCE WHITE,
HUMAN DEBRIS: THE INJURED WORKER iN AMERICA 153 (1982).
144. RAYMOND LEvnrr & NANCY SAMELSON, CONSTRUCnON SAFETY MANAGEMENT 152 (1987).
145. ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA, INC., MANUAL OF ACCIDENT PREVENTION
IN CONSTRUCTION X (3d ed. 1949 [1927]).
146. But see 1 INT'L LAB. OFFICE, ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY at 14
(discussing such a requirement).
147. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.8 (1993).
148. Clifford May, Record Fines Are Imposed in Building Collapse That Killed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 1987, at BI.
149. Legislative Hearings on the Construction Safety, Health, and Education Improvement Act of
1990: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and Safety of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1990) (Rep. Shays).
150. See infra table 2. This figure includes illness fatalities for which the BLS published separate
totals for the years 1971 to 1973.
151. Diane Cotter & Janet Macon, Death in Industry, 1985: BLS Survey Findings, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., Apr. 1987, at 45, 47.
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sampling errors in the fatality data (statistically rare occurrences), making year-to-year
comparisons for this group of small employers of questionable reliability."'' Based
Table 2: Workers Killed in the United States, 1971-1991 (BLS-OSHA)t
Year Total Construction YI ear Total Construction
1971 4200* 800* 1982 4090 720
1972 5500 1500 1983 3100 670
1973 5700 1000 1984 3740 660
1974 5900 1200 1985 3750 980
1975 5300 1000 1986 3610 670
1976 4500 800 1987 3400 820
1977 4760 NA** 1988 3270 850
1978 4590 925 1989 3600 780
1979 4950 960 1990 2900 700
1980 4400 839 1991 2800 500
1981 4370 800
*Covered only July I-Dec. 31
**BLS did not publish industry-level fatality data in 1977.tt
on estimates of annual fatalities among employing units with 10 or fewer employees
for the years prior to 1977, the BLS suggested that 800 fatalities be added to the totals
for later years.' Making this adjustment for the 15 years from 1977 to 1991 would
add 12,000 deaths, bringing the total for the 19.5 years of the survey to almost exactly
100,000 fatalities.
Because a recent study shows that the exclusion of small firms may be a greater
source of underestimation than previously recognized, the BLS's small-firm adjustment
is almost certainly insufficient. A computer analysis of 500,000 safety-inspection re-
152. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2047: OCCUPATIONAL INJU-
RIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE UNITED STATES BY INDUSTRY, 1977, at 5 (1980).
t Sources: 1971-1973: U.S. BLS, Bull. 1798: OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES BY IN-
DUSTRY: JULY 1 - DECEMBER 31, 1971, tab. 4 at 13 (1973); U.S. BLS, Bull. 1830: OCCUPATIONAL
INJURIES AND ILLNESSES BY INDUSTRY, 1972, tab. 5 at 66 (1974); U.S. BLS, Bull. 1830: OCCUPATION-
AL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES BY INDUSTRY, 1973, tab. 6 at 73 (1975); 1974-1977: U.S. BLS, Rep. 460:
CHARTBOOK ON OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES, 1974, tab. 4 at 25 (1976); U.S. BLS, Rep.
501: CHARTBOOK ON OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES, 1975, tab. 3 *at 30 (1977); U.S. BLS,
Rep. 535: CHARTBOOK ON OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES, 1976, tab. 4 at 32 (1978) 1978-
1991: U.S. BLS, Office of Safety, Health, & Working Conditions (Feb. 7, 1994) (furnished to author).
tt BLS offered no express reason for its omission of industry-level fatalities for 1977 or for its
resumed publication of such data in 1978. U.S. BLS, Bull. 2078: OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILL-
NESSES IN THE UNITED STATES BY INDUSTRY, 1978, at 6-7 (1980).
153. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2047: OCCUPATIONAL INJU-
RIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE UNITED STATES BY INDUSTRY, 1977, at 5 (1980). For descriptions of the
scope of the surveys earlier in the 1970s, see BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR,
Rep. 438: OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH STATISTICS: CONCEPTS AND METHODS (1975); BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, Rep. 518: OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH STATIS-
TICS: CONCEPTS AND METHODS (1978).
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cords by the Wall Street Journal revealed that from 1988 to 1992, 4,337 workers died
at workplaces with fewer than twenty employees, whereas only 127 died at those with
more than 2,500 employees. The ratio of the fatality rates in the two groups was al-
most 500 to 1. "
For construction alone, the BLS-OSHA surveys showed 17,174 deaths for these
two decades or almost one-fifth of all fatalities (table 2). The annual average of about
880 was little more than a third of the 2,300 annual fatalities recorded by the NSC for
the same period. 5 This discrepancy has in part been explained by a controlled ex-
periment, which revealed a cluster of non-reporting of fatalities to the OSHA among
construction firms." In addition, whereas the NSC does not discriminate against
dead self-employeds, OSHA covers only employees. 15 Despite all these flaws, an
OSHA contractee certified the BLS survey as "the only reliable national measure of
occupational injury and illness." '
A third fatality data base is built on the work-related deaths that employers are
required to report to the OSHAdm 59 These fatalities have run considerably higher
than the BLS figures. The 4,792 construction deaths reported to OSHAdm from 1985
through 1989 exceed the BLS survey results by 17 percent."W The discrepancy is to
be expected given the BLS survey's many exclusions. By the same token, however,
both OSHA and BLS data are underestimates because firms may underreport, and nei-
ther agency's reports include the formally self-employed, who are numerous in con-
struction, or workers not covered by OSHA or covered by other safety legislation.16
By using death certificates and medical examiner records, researchers have discovered
ihat OSHA fatality reports capture only one-third of all occupational injury deaths."
Death certificates alone, however, also underestimate total occupational fatalities.'63
Yet a fourth estimate of fatalities is derived from the National Institute for Occu-
pational Safety and Health ("NIOSH") National Traumatic Occupational Fatalities
("NTOF') surveillance system for the years 1980 to 1989. Based on death certificates
from state vital statistics agencies which are estimated as identifying 80 percent of
work-related fatalities, NTOF reported 11,417 construction fatalities during the 1980s.
The annual average of 1,142 deaths is about 50 percent and 20 percent higher than the
154. The rates were 1.97 and 0.004 per 1,000 workers respectively. Barbara Marsh, Chances of
Getting Hurt Is Generally Far Higher at Smaller Companies, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3. 1994, at Al. Ac-
cording to OSHA data, 45 percent of all construction fatalities occur in workplaces with 25 or fewer
employees. S. REP. No. 558: CONSTRUCION SAFETY, HEALTH, AND EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT ACT,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1990).
155. An intermediate figure comes from a labor group estimation that three to four construction
workers are killed daily. WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1994, at Al.
156. COUNTING INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE WORKPLACE at 56-60, 145, 148-49.
157. 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(6), 654 (1988).
158. Norman Root & David McCaffrey, Providing More Information on Work Injury and Illness,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 1978, at 16, 21 n.2 (citing 1976 Stanford Research Institute report).
159. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.8 (1993).
160. U.S. OSHA, ANALYSIS OF CONSTRUCrION FATALITIES at 3. The BLS data reported by OSHA
are for some years identical with but for other years differ from those furnished by BLS itself. Id. at
53, 56.
161. Id. at 51-55.
162. Nancy Stout & Catherine Bell, Effectiveness of Source Documents for Identifying Fatal Occu-
pational Injuries: A Synthesis of Studies, 81 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 725 (1991).
163. Julie Russell & Carol Conroy, Representativeness of Deaths Identified Through the Injury-at-
Work Item on the Death Certificate: Implications for Surveillance, 81 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1613
(1991).
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BLS and OSHA figures respectively, and about one-half of the NSC total. According
to the NTOF study, the fatal injury rate in construction during the 1980s, 25.6 per
100,000 full-time workers, was almost four times the all-industry average.'" One of
the principal reasons for the discrepancy between the NTOF data on the one hand and
the BLS/OSHA on the other is the former's inclusion of the nominally self-em-
ployed.'"
A Census of Death Comes to Life
There is no "gold standard" for counting the number of work-related ... injury
deaths.' 66
Thus despite many years of intensive public-private cooperation, estimates of
total work-related deaths have varied widely, with the NSC's figures exceeding those
of the BLS by a factor of three.16 As late as the 1980s, medical researchers con-
firmed that "a complete series of fatal occupational work injuries (all those in a speci-
fied time period for a defined population or geographic area) has never been described.
In large part, this is because no single source of data permits easy identification of all
cases."'
168
The BLS itself "had doubts about the quality" of its own annual estimates of
fatalities. One key flaw in the data, as a Government Accounting Office study re-
vealed, was, predictably enough, employers' unpoliced underestimates of injuries as
recorded on their OSHA logs.'" The BLS therefore commissioned a study in the
mid-1980s by the National Research Council, which "found it rather startling that an
agreed-upon method has not been devised to estimate a phenomenon as basic as trau-
matic death in the [American] workplace."'"7 Since the BLS excluded from its annual
survey entities employing fewer than eleven employees and accounting for one-third of
total employment, it is unclear why the BLS was startled by this finding--especially
since its methodology has otherwise been subject to sharp attack.'
Years of critique and self-critique finally resulted in a new approach, which
broke both with surveys based on employer self-reporting and with methodologically
inscrutable estimates. Twenty-three years after OSHA's enactment, the BLS published
the first national Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries with data for 1992. Relying on
.multiple sources such as death certificates, reports by coroners and medical examiners,
164. Suzanne Kisner & David Fosbroke, Injury Hazards in the Construction Industry, 36 J. OCCu-
PATIONAL MED. 137 (1994).
165. Nancy Stout-Wiegand, Fatal Occupational Injuries in US Industries, 1984: Comparison of Two
National Surveillance Systems, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1215, 1216 (1988).
166. Suruda & Emmett, supra note 137, at 870.
167. Guy Toscano & Janice Windau, Further Test of a Census Approach to Compiling Data on
Fatal Work Injuries, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 1991, at 33.
168. Susan Baker et al., Fatal Occupational Injuries, 248 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 692 (1982).
169. U.S. GAO, OCCUPATIONAL SAFErY AND HEALTH: ASSURING ACCURACY IN EMPLOYER INJURY
AND ILLNESS RECORDS (HRD-89-23, 1988).
170. COUNTING INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE WORKPLACE at 6. See also "News Conference
with Robert Reich, Secretary of Labor, and William Barron, Acting Commissioner of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics," Fed. News Serv., Oct. 1, 1993 (Lexis) (statement by Barron).
171. See e.g., Arthur Oleinick et al., Current Method of Estimating Severity for Occupational Inju-
ries and Illnesses: Data from the 1986 Michigan Comprehensive Compensable Injury and Illness Data-
base, 23 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 231 (1993); Arthur Rubens, Workplace Statistics Can't.Cut to the Heart,
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY, Aug. 1993, at 64.
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and autopsy, workers' compensation, OSHA, state motor vehicle, and news media
reports, the Census aspires to be a complete enumeration, the accuracy of which is
supposed to be secured by the requirement that a fatality be identified by at least two
sources. In keeping with the comprehensive scope of the Census, its aggregate fatality
figure of 6,083 includes 1,216 workplace homicides and suicides. Since the NSC's
focus on "accidental deaths" excludes such acts, the 4,867 non-intentional fatalities
counted by the Census amounted to only 57 percent of the NSC's total of 8,500 for
1992, whereas the 903 enumerated construction fatalities fell 30 percent short of the
NSC figure.
72
This discrepancy suggests either that the Census is less than comprehensive or
that the NSC, despite its reputation as a tool of big business, has been exaggerating
industrial fatalities. Those responsible for compiling the NSC and Census fatality sta-
tistics tentatively agree that the correct figure lies somewhere between the two. They
believe, for example, that the Census may be missing work-related transportation fatal-
ities that involve vehicles that are not obviously identifiable to the police or medical
authorities as having been driven by workers in the course of their employment.
Where, in addition, the dead were nonemployees, who are statutorily excluded from
workers' compensation, or were for any other reason outside the scope of such state
programs, neither a death certificate nor workers' compensation report would identify
such fatalities."
As these enumeration problems demonstrate, the recent intensification of efforts
by employers to treat workers as nonemployees in order to lower costs74 may also
be contributing to an underreporting of industrial fatalities. Although it may be unclear
how a dead self-employee would comply with a statutory duty to record and notify the
OSHA of his own death, the exclusion of alleged nonemployees from OSHA and
workers' compensation programs makes even less sense than it does under other labor-
protective regimes, 17' especially in construction, where the formally self-employed
172. Guy Toscano, The BLS Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries, COMPENSATION & WORKING
CONDITIONS, June 1991, at 1; Guy Toscano & Janice Windau, Fatal Work Injuries: Results from the
1992 National Census, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Oct. 1993, at 39, tab. 6 at 45; Tracy Jack & Mark Zak,
Results from the First National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries, 1992, COMPENSATION AND
WORKING CONDrTONS, Dec. 1993, at 1; Janice Windau & Guy Toscano, Workplace Homicides in
1992, COMPENSATION & WORKING CONDITIONS, Feb. 1994, at 1, tab. 1 at 3; NSC, ACCIDENT FACTs,
1993 EDITION, at 27. The BLS later identified an additional 134 fatalities for 1992, raising the total to
6217. The total for 1993 is 6271. U.S. BLS, National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries, 1993
(news release 94-384, Aug. 10, 1994).
173. Telephone interview with Alan Hoskin, manager, Statistics Dept., NSC, Mar. 23, 1994; tele-
phone interview with Guy Toscano, Office of Safety, Health, and Working Conditions, BLS, Mar. 23,
1994; NSC, ACCIDENT FACTS, 1993 EDrTON, at 39.
174. See, e.g., Daniel Forbes, The Growing Ranks of Contract Workers, DUN'S BuSINESS MONTH,
Mar. 1986, at 56; Louis Uchitelle, Newest Corporate Refugees: Self-Employed But Low-Paid, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1993, at Al; Marc Linder & Larry Zacharias, Opening Coase's Other Black Box:
Why Workers Submit to Vertical Integration into Firms, 18 J. CORP. L. 371 (1993); Andrea Gerlin,
Spread of Illegal Home Sewing Is Fueled by Immigrants, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1994, at BI; Robert
Pear, Clinton Health Care Plan Poses Question, 'Who Is an Employee?', N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1994, at
Al.
175. A half-century ago Congress considered a comprehensive "Workers' Social Insurance Act,"
which would not only have included self-employeds, but even conferred guaranteed annual incomes on
them. Social Insurance: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-12 (1936). For an excellent overview of arguments in favor of equalization of treatment of
self-employeds and employees in social insurance programs based on the former's equally insecure
position as sellers of their labor power, see Olaf Sund, Die Sozialpolitik fir Selbstdndige, in
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"often work on multi-employer projects and, therefore, can affect the safety and health
of other construction workers.""1 6
The most startling revelation of the Census is that highway accidents and homi-
cides were the leading causes of occupational injury-fatalities, accounting for 18 and
17 percent respectively of the total of 6,083 deaths.1" More specifically, the Census
found that highway accidents were the leading cause of death for male workers while
homicides were the leading cause of death for women workers nationwide, for all
workers in New York City, and for certain occupations such as taxi drivers.'
7
1
The data on female workers show that the traditional discrimination against and
underrepresentation of women in such dangerous industries as construction, mining,
agriculture, transportation, and even certain manufacturing occupations have largely
spared them stereotypical industrial death and given a new dimension to femme fatale.
This finding mirrors earlier research on nonfatal injuries that showed that although
women who work in predominantly male occupations experienced injury rates similar
to men's, their concentration in less dangerous occupations produced significantly
lower overall injury rates. 79 If women accounted for only one percent of industrial
fatalities in the United Kingdom at the turn of the century and only two percent in the
United States in 1913,'" by the time of the 1992 Census they still accounted for only
7 percent. Thus although there are almost as many women in the work force as men,
the latter account for more than 13 times as many fatalities as the former. The 172
female homicide victims represented one-sixth of all murdered workers and two-fifths
of all female fatalities, whereas the 254 women who died from non-homicidal injuries
accounted for only 5 percent of such fatalities. 8' A similar pattern of gender-specific
violence had already emerged from the NIOSH NTOF surveillance system during the
1980s. Of the 63,589 workers identified as having succumbed to fatal occupational
injuries from 1980 to 1989, only 6 percent were women; of these women, 41 percent
were victims of homicides compared to only 10 percent among men. 2
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See also SAFETY AND HEALTH AT WORK: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 1970-72, at 55 ("There
may . . . be situations where groups of self-employed persons may be to all intents and purposes in
the same position as employees as regards their methods and conditions of work, that is to say their
methods of work and working environment may not be within their direct control").
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HEALTH 729 (1991); Jess Kraus, Homicide While at Work: Persons, Industries, and Occupations at
High Risk, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1285 (1987); Harold Davis, Workplace Homicides of Texas Males,
77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1290 (1987).
179. Norman Root & Judy Daley, Are Women Safer Workers? A New Look at the Data, MONTHLY
LAB. REv., Mar. 1981, at 3.
180. Hoffman, supra note 28, at 421 (U.K. data for 1895-1906); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
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Safety and Profit: Zero-Sum Game?
As soon as the idea roots itself ... that there are no industrial accidents, we
shall begin to get full statistics of injuries. Working people speak of industrial inju-
ries-they speak of murder .... Are we not foolish to talk of industrial accidents
in a world governed by law, we who are all servants of modem science ... ?
There is one ... figure which serves to symbolize the statistics of industrial inju-
ries to working people-the symbolic figure of Greed. 3
These patterns create the impression that the hazards of the workplace merely
reflect those of an increasingly and randomly dangerous world at large." Indeed,
homicides at work may, ironically, seem even more random that non-workplace homi-
cides since most of the latter are committed by family members or acquaintances and
relatively few in association with the commission of another felony, whereas most
workplace homicides are committed by strangers in connection with robberies. 5 Me-
dia interpretation of such findings is continuous with the tradition that tends to view
the place of employment not as a crucible of antagonistic class relationships but as a
locus of societally indifferent individualized human interest stories."
These phenomena and the sudden prominence that the news media, which other-
wise devote little space to run-of-the-mill non-mass industrial fatalities, have conferred
on them divert attention from the failure of the existing political-economic system to
impose on firms liability costs in excess of injury prevention costs'87 or to incarcerate
employers whose operations cause mass fatalities. Thus in 1988, after 18 years of
OSHA and an additional 200,000 fatalities (as estimated by the NSC), the House Com-
mittee on Government Operations published a report entitled, Getting Away with Mur-
der in the Workplace: OSHA's Nonuse of Criminal Penalties for Safety Violations.'
Even though "[tihe penalty for removing a tag from a mattress is higher than"' 6 the
weak criminal sanctions under OSHA against employers whose willful violation of a
standard causes an employee's death,"9 "[n]o jail term ha[d] ever been meted out in
Catherine Bell, Fatal Occupational Injuries in the United States, 1980 Through 1985, 262 JAMA 3047
(1990).
183. Florence Kelley, Our Lack of Statistics, 38 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCd. 94, 97
(1911).
184. "Dangerous weapons and dangerous people are offered greater Constitutional protection than
most hazards in our environment." Murder at Work, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1273 (1987) (editorial).
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cide, 36 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 125 (1994); Windau & Toscano, supra note 172, tbl. 8 at 8. Some
workplace homicides, especially those by subordinates against supervisors, may be (dangerous) employ-
ment-related. Thus a workers' compensation referee ruled that a black automobile worker's preexisting
but nondisabling tendency toward paranoia had been "aggravated by his being unfairly assigned unde-
sirable work in front of a hot oven, cheated out of advancement opportunities, addressed by a foreman
as 'nigger' and 'boy,' denied medical benefits .... and, finally, fired after refusing to do a job he
considered dangerous." Michigan Rules Chrysler Must Pay Benefits to Man Who Killed 3, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 7, 1973, at 22.
186. See, e.g., Matthew Purdy, Workplace Murders Provoke Lawsuits and Better Security, N.Y.
TtMES, Feb. 14, 1994, at Al.
187. Harry M. Philo, Revoke the Legal License to Kill Construction Workers, 19 DE PAUL L. REV.
1 (1969); To Promote Health and Safety at 38-76 (testimony of Harry Philo).
188. H.R. REp. No. 1051, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
189. OSHA Penalties and Procedures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Labor
& Human Resources Comm., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (S. Hrg. 101-390, 1990) (Rep. Lantos).
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a criminal case arising from an OSHA investigation into the death of a worker."',
Not until 1989 did the first and only employer serve time (45 days) in prison for vio-
lating OSHA."l
Overall a sea change in discourse has taken place in the quarter-century since
'OSHA's enactment, when legislative advocates stressed the NSC's estimates of
140,000 industrial fatalities during the 1960s in order to conjure up images of satanic
mills.' 3 With the shift in employment away from the primary and secondary sectors
of material production--only one-third of Census fatalities in 1992 occurred at indus-
trial places, in mines, or on farms'94-to the tertiary sector comprising less manual,
bureaucratic service work, where the bulk of workplace homicides are committed,
public attention is no longer directed to the thousands of construction workers who are
"electrocuted, buried alive, crushed, or fall to their death"'95 or to the laborers whose
accumulated lifetime of exposure to unhealthful conditions has led to an average age
of death of 62.'9 Instead, the press concentrates on NIOSH alerts concerning the ho-
micidal risk exposure of those who work alone exchanging money with the public at
night in high-crime areas."
This much more diffuse etiology deflects attention from the divergence between
social and private costs, which underlies firms' failure to take adequate safety precau-
tions. One particularly poignant example of such profit-maximizing and injury-inducing
entrepreneurial strategies is the expansion of output and reduction of unit costs through
imposition of overtime and speed-ups on unskilled, low-paid workers, who then be-
come fatigued. 8 In construction, today even more so than in the 1920s, "[mloney
offenders).
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William Schriver, Study of Fatalities in the Construction Industry, SURV. BUS., Summer/Fall 1993, at
45.
196. The Construction Safety, Health and Education Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 1063 before
the Subcomm. on Health and Safety of the Committtee on Education and Labor, House of Representa-
tives, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 243 (1991) (testimony of Dr. Knut Ringen on Laborers' Union mem-
bership in Indiana).
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(Pub. No. 93-109, 1993). On the media's treatment of co-worker homicide, see Erik Larson, A False
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and work schedules drive the industry so there's still an attitude that work must be
completed quickly even if it means taking safety shortcuts.""" Consequently, in an
industry which does not yet subscribe to the view that "[o]ccupational injury and dis-
eases are no longer considered to be the inevitable tribute to progress, '2 "overexer-
tion" is still the leading cause of accidents in private-sector construction,"' and more
than one-fifth of construction laborers cite the "fast pace of work" as a factor contrib-
uting to the injuries that they sustain.2'
Remarkably, whereas one-quarter of private sector construction injuries are
caused by overexertion, on work performed for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
where the aggregate accident rate is much lower, the corresponding share is only one-
tenth. 3 Nor is this superior government safety record unusual: the "extensive safety
program" developed by the Tennessee Valley Authority in the 1930s, for example, also
enabled it to achieve a rate of disabling injuries only one-sixth that of private
firms.20 4
A basis for such different approaches to safety by the state and the for-profit
sector has been set forth by a leading labor economist who nevertheless denied that
"the capitalistic system" is to blame for industrial accidents because the profit motive
is fed by what consumers want "or can be made to want." Although under socialism
production would still take place in hazardous factories, he conceded one "important"
difference-
that the state, having substituted group welfare for the individual... profits mo-
tive, takes an even longer view than the far-sighted capitalistic employer: the state
can make the prevention of accidents a vital part of group welfare rather than
merely good business and, not being under the duress of competition, need not
sacrifice its ideals for the demands of any immediate situation. In short, human
values would be paramount.'
A comparison between socialist East and capitalist West Germany provided the
most striking test and corroboration of this claim. Confirming that the latter's industrial
injury rate was twice the former's, a West German government commission in 1971
explained the difference by reference to the superior system of labor protective con-
trols in East Germany based in large part on the joint participation of unions and
works councils.'
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TIMES, Aug. 21, 1993, at 25 (quoting risk management consultant).
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202. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2252: INJURIES TO CON-
STRUCTION LABORERS 4-5, tbl. 11 at 16 (1986).
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Corps of Engineers' safety program, which is imposed on the private contractors working for it and
reportedly results in the lower accident rate, casts doubt on the claim that "no bosses' government
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ism Kills 51 Workers, CHALLENGE, May 10, 1978, at 5.
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Industry 1939, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 1940, at 935,936 (vol. 50).
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The same point was made negatively by the head of a captive (that is, steel
company-owned) mining operation in explaning his commercial competitors' much
higher fatality rates: ."If your stockholders expect to get a certain return, you've got to
get it. And therefore you've got to be content with less safety if you're going to get
more profit."' 2t And as the vice president of a construction company and president
of the National Constructors Association, an organization of the largest U.S. industrial
construction firms, obliquely captured his competitors' reluctance to divert
accumulatable profits into expenditures that might spare their workers maiming or
death: "Contractors, by the very nature of their work, are cost-conscious, but their
approach to savings is paradoxical. When compiling an estimate of cost, safety protec-
tion costs are often arbitrarily cut in an endeavor to be low bidder."'2m
The new focus on such firm-external injury sources as murderers and drunken
drivers also abstracts from the empirically verified impact of the business cycle on
injuries. The periodic hurling of inexperienced workers into and their expulsion from
production-which unemployment then deprives them of the continuous experience
that forms the best workers-are peculiarities of capitalism. The enormous increase in
injury rates during World War II, for example, was in part a product of the unprece-
dented long-term unemployment of the Great Depression.'" Nonfatal injuries, rela-
tively few of which are caused by highway accidents or assaults, have retained a much
more pronounced cyclical character.1
Conjunctural impacts on construction injuries take on a special form. Because
industry practice has not been to include in bids a sum for safety and health measures,
the International Labour Office has observed, "in times of recession there is a tempta-
tion to provide in the tender for methods of work that are cheaper but less safe ....
The temptation is even greater when the cost of proper precautions is high in relation
to the value of the job." '' Since, from the workers' perspective, "'job security is
more important than job safety"' during recessions, according to an OSHAdm inspec-
tor, "'workers don't ask questions when a foreman tells them to do something that
might be dangerous."'' ' The resulting rise in injuries may be concealed by the cir-
cumstance that workers may keep working during such periods of high unemployment
for fear that employers will replace them with sturdier members of the reserve
army.
213
During upswings, in contrast, speedups, the exhaustion of the supply of skilled
workers, and the hiring of less experienced workers lead to higher injury rates.2"4
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This cyclical structure assumes a special profile in construction with its
disproportionately large sector of small, interest-sensitive firms compelled to complete
contracts as quickly as possible in order to reduce loans charges, greater (and to some
extent irrational) seasonality" 5 and crowding of projects into short periods, and reli-
ance on discrete projects. One extreme manifestation of the transiency of construction
is the fact that three-quarters of injured construction laborers have less than one year's
experience and one-eighth of all injuries to these workers take place on their first day
at work, while one-quarter of all construction injuries occur during the worker's first
month on the job. 16
Counting on OSHA
In some states, there are far more game wardens than there are work safety inspec-
tors. This had led some to observe that perhaps after all, safety is "for the
birds.", '
The issue of the extent and trend of industrial fatalities played an important part
in the struggles for state intervention beginning in the late 1960s. "[T]he most impor-
tant single factor" that prompted congressional action on OSHA "[p]robably ... was
the observed increase in the industrial accident rate, which rose nearly 29% from 1961
to 1970."2s Such statistics are, however, too dry and barren to mobilize the political
process. But then: "Good empirical studies are neither necessary nor sufficient for the
evolution of good policy. Sensational reports about tragic events.., are often more
effective in eliciting legislative action." '219 Although two-thirds of mine deaths occur
individually in solitary "accidents" such as roof falls, the fact that explosions and fires
also kill large numbers of workers at one time creates the kind of mass suffering qua
human interest story that compels news media to publicize the dangerous work, cava-
lier business attitudes, and lackadaisical government enforcement. Thus the deaths of
78 miners in the very modem Consolidation Coal Company mine in Farmington, West
Virginia in 1968 galvanized public opinion long enough to pass the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969;2 ° the 91 miners who were killed in the Sunshine sil-
ver mine in Idaho in 1972 focused the congressional mind sufficiently to amend that
statute in 1977 to include all mines.22" '
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Largely deprived of the sympathy that the non-subterranean population periodi-
cally displays towards those whose life-chances have forced them into their other-
worldly fossorial work, the rest of the working class faced significant political-econom-
ic and propagandistic obstacles to its efforts to impose legal restrictions on employers'
control of the workplace. These barriers emerged clearly during the run-up to the en-
actment of OSHA. Resistance by the state to demands for intervention into managerial
prerogatives was not new.m Prior to 1970, the federal government's occupational
safety and health private-sector jurisdiction applied to workers in plants with federal
contracts as well as to longshore and harbor workers.223 Yet as a result of "[tihe
Government's long-standing distaste for a stronger, more aggressive enforcement poli-
cy ... the available penalties [we]re almost never invoked against corporate offend-
11., 22 4
ers." 2
At the same time, advocates of state intervention had to contend with the
disproportionality between media reporting on strikes and accidents, especially in the
construction industry. Injuries had "cost the industry" 17 million man-days annually
between 1958 and 1965 whereas work stoppages resulted in only 3.8 million lost man-
days;2" indeed, in 1967 construction workers alone sustained disabling injuries re-
sulting in almost as many days lost as days lost to work stoppages in all industries.'
If, however, the president of the Building and Construction Trades Department of the
AFL-CIO testified to Congress, the figures were reversed:
The story would be spread over the front pages of the world. Loud demands would
follow that the labor leaders involved in the stoppages be called to account. Public
opinion would be outraged. On the other hand, accidents which result in millions of
man-days lost-not to mention the human suffering involved-generally are tucked
away on the back pages to be eventually ignored.'
Even the enactment and implementation of OSHA have failed to dissolve
employers' resistance to systemic change. The corporate safety movement and con-
struction firms in particular continue to insist that injuries are largely the result of
human, that is, the workers' own fault.2"' "[Tihe only way to make improvements in
at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1988)); Barry Newman, Silver-Mine Disaster Prompts Fight on Laws Tight-
ening Safety Rules, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1972, at 1, 21; S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4,
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3403-04.
222. On the continuity of such weak enforcement under the Mine Safety Act, see Burt Schorr,
Getting Off Lightly, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1971, at 1, 25; Rand Guffey, Mine Safety Furror, WALL
ST. J., June 25, 1970, at 1, 23.
223. See, e.g., Walsh-Healey Government Contracts Act, ch. 881, § I(e), 49 Stat. 2036, 2037
(1936) (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 35(e) (1988)); Service Contract Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 89-
286, § 2(a) (3) (1965) (codified at 41 U.S.C. § 351(a) (3) (1988)); Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 85-742, 72 Stat. 835 (1958) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 941
(1988)) (enjoining employers to maintain "reasonably safe employment" for employees on the navigable
waters of the United States and authorizing Secretary of Labor to issue regulations to protect such
employees).
224. Walter Rugaber, Records Show That Lax Government Regulations Allow Occupational Hazards
to Grow, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1970, at 17.
225. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1656: COMPENSATION IN
THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY: EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS, UNION SCALES, AND EARNINGS 23 (1970).
226. Federal Construction Safety: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969).
227. Construction Safety: Hearings Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 6 (1968) (C.J. Haggerty).
228. BERMAN, supra note 97, at 76.
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safety in construction," the chairman of the legislative committee of the Associated
General Contractors of America explained to Congress, "is to educate the individual to
operate on a safe basis."' Where, however, employers impose piece rates, which
make workers "reluctant to use safety devices.., for fear of slowing their production
and cutting their pay checks," 2 ' the injunction to operate safely might come with
more grace from someone other than the employer who set those rates.23" '
This individualizing, blame-the-victim approach takes on an added dimension
when a leader of the antiunion wing of the construction industry safety organization
analogizes the victims to naughty children whose parent-employers are unfairly held
legally responsible for their carelessness:
[I]t's similar to dealing with children. If you tell them, go play and don't get close
to the river. When they get too close, you have to do something. But they are
personally held accountable.
When they are in school and you have a test, the teacher says look, we're
going to have a test tomorrow, you need to study this and study this, and some of
them study it and they get good grades and some others don't study and they don't
get good grades, but they are individually and personally held accountable. 2
Construction unions have accommodated this programmatic infantilization of the
working class by failing to vindicate an autonomous role for workers in creating safer
working conditions than have traditionally been compatible with profitability. Instead,
for example, the president of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters chose to combat
management's line by pushing employers to exercise their panoply of managerial pre-
rogatives vis-A-vis a passively compliant labor force:
The employer sets the tone. If he refuses to tolerate unsafe work from workers who
have been trained and warned about unsafe practices, then fires them if they con-
tinue to work unsafely, every other man and woman on that job will get the mes-
sage and work carefully. It's a simple proposition-you lose your job if you don't
listen to the boss."
The dangers inherent in according employers a monopoly over safety emerge
clearly from their own reaction to a proposed amendment to OSHA that would require
construction employers to appoint a project safety coordinator to enforce a statutorily
required health and safety plan to protect workers on each project." When asked by
a legislator why construction firms could not appoint their foremen as safety coordina-
229. Supra note 227, at 44.
230. Byron Calame, Job-Hazard Law Spurs Complaints from Firms on Cost of Safeguards, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 1, 1971, at 1, 19. Engels had noticed 125 years earlier that the necessity of working fast
caused accidents. FRIEDRICH ENGELS, DIE LAGE DER ARBEITENDEN KLASSE IN ENGLAND, in 2 KARL
MARX [&] FRIEDRICH ENGELS, WERKE 225, 388 (1957 [1844]).
231. See STUDENTERFRONTENS ARBEJDSMEDICINGRUPPE, MALER RAPPORTEN: EN FOREL0BIG RAPPORT
OM SUNDHEDSFARERNE I MALERFAGET 24 (Aarhus: StudenterrAdet, n.d. [ca. 1971]) (discussing masks
for painters); OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK, July 1989, at 137; TOM DWYER, LIFE AND DEATH AT
WORK: INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AS A CASE OF SOCIALLY PRODUCED ERROR 104-105 (1991).
232. Supra note 196, at 28 (testimony of Greg Denton, director of safety, Fluor-Daniel and chair,
Associated Builders & Contractors, Safety Comm.).
233. Id. at 218 (statement of Sigurd Lucassen).
234. H.R. 1063, § 4(a), H.R. Rep. No. 662, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1991).
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tors, the president of one firm, who also represented the National Association of Home
Builders, responded that: "That will not work .... The reason is that the foreman has
a conflict of interest .... The foreman's job is to make sure that the work is done on
a specific schedule." While conceding that the foreman's job always involved "safety
too," the employers' representative complained "that if we said to the foreman, you are
the safety coordinator but ... also part of your job is to get this particular application
completed by a certain ... time, when he sees a specific problem, is he going to look
at the safety issue or is he going to look at his time schedule?" '35 Here the contradic-
tion between human needs and the requirements of self-expanding value is at its sharp-
est.
The continuing high level and rate of fatalities and nonfatal injuries in construc-
tion, most of which even industry representatives admit are preventable,236 is in part
a function of the below-average provisioning by building firms of on-site doctors. 37
Although OSHA mandates safe workplaces,23 the statute itself does not require em-
ployers to provide on-site physicians, nurses, or industrial hygienists. Instead, under
OSHA regulations:
(a) The employer shall ensure the ready availability of medical personnel for
advice and consultation on matters of plant health.
(b) In the absence of an infirmary, clinic, or hospital in near proximity to the
workplace which is used for the treatment of all injured employees, a person or
persons shall be adequately trained to render first aid.239
Regulations under OSHA and the Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards
Act (which covers federal public works)2" specifically tailored to the construction
industry add that:
(b) Provision shall be made prior to the, commencement of the project for
prompt medical attention in case of serious injury.
(c) In the absence of an infirmary, clinic, hospital, or physician, that is rea-
sonably accessible in terms of time and distance to the worksite, which is available
for the treatment of injured employees, a person who has a valid certificate license
in first-aid training ... shall be available at the worksite to render first aid."4
235. Supra note 196, at 36 (testimony of Ira Norris).
236. Legislative Hearings on the Construction Safety, Health, and Education Improvement Act of
1990 at 62-63 (statement of Neil A. Norman, president elect, National Society of Professional Engi-
neers). See also id. at 353 (testimony of J. Donald Millar, director, NIOSH); LaBar, supra note 20, at
63.
237. The desolate state of industrial injury statistics in the United States corresponded, at least until
the advent of OSHA and NIOSH, to the lack of a national occupational injury and disease prevention
policy or an appropriate research program. For examples of the much more advanced European re-
search in construction safety and health, see JAi' WAHLBERG, YRKESHUDSJUKDOMAR HOS
BYGGNADSARBETARE (Byggnadsindustrins Forskningsrapporter och Uppsatser No. 11; n.d. [19681);
SEVED LINDQUIST, HORSELSKADOR HOS BYGGNADSARBETARE (Byggnadsindustrins Forskningsrapporter
och Uppsatser No. 15; n.p., n.d. [1969]); JAN KRONLUND, PA BYGGET: ARBETSPSYKOLOGISKA STUDIER
I BYGGNADSINDUSTRIN (1969); III. INTERNATIONALES SYMPosiuM ARBEITSHYGIENE UND ARBEITSSCHUTZ
tM BAUWESEN (1972).
238. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (a) (1) (1988).
239. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.151 (1992). The term "in near proximity" survived a joint challenge as to
vagueness by the OSHA Review Commission and an employer; Brennan v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission and Santa Fe Trail Transport Co., 505 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974).
240. 40 U.S.C. § 333 (1988).
241. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.50(b) & (c) (1988).
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Construction firms in fact employ proportionally far fewer doctors and nurses
than firms in general. In part this underrepresentation may be a function of the dispro-
portionate weight of small firms in the industry. Overall in the mid-1970s, 81 percent
of all U.S. firms with more than 50,000 employees employed at least one full-time
doctor compared to only 3 percent of those with fewer than 1,000 employees."2 In
1972, the OSHAdm and NIOSH conducted the first survey of medical services provid-
ed by employers. In contrast to 21 percent of all private nonfarm and 69 percent of all
manufacturing employees, only 1.5 percent of construction employees worked in estab-
lishments providing nurses' services. Similarly, only one in 13 construction employees
worked in an establishment served by a doctor full time or part time compared to 26
percent of all private nonfarm and 36 percent of manufacturing employees. Moreover,
only one construction employee in 14 worked in establishments providing the services
of an industrial hygienist-who is qualified "to identify, measure, and evaluate health
hazards in the work environment and to plan measures to eliminate, control, or reduce
such hazards"--compared to 18 percent of all private nonfarm and 36 percent of man-
ufacturing employees.243 Finally, a more recent OSHAdm survey reveals that only
one-sixth of all construction employees worked in firms that provide physical exams
and medical tests to detect injuries and illnesses potentially related to work activities
compared to one-third of all employees and three-fifths of all those employed in manu-
facturing.2 '
Finding no mathematical correlation between injury rates and the degree of pro-
vision of medical services among industry divisions, the BLS concluded "that the
availability of nurses' services did not appear to be related to injury and illness experi-
ence.""24 Presumably the correlation in question is that between a high injury rate and
a low degree of provision of medical services-as it exists, for example, in construc-
tion. Such a tangible causal chain would make plausible the conclusion that increasing
such services would contribute to the reduction of injuries. In the more socially orient-
ed societies of Western Europe, the starting point is inverted: there the initial hypothe-
sis is that branches with high injury rates are precisely the ones that should also be
well provided with medical services.'
Health and safety workers can, to be sure, prevent numerous injuries, mitigate
the severity of others, and reduce fatalities through life-saving emergency services (as
has also increasingly become the case on the military battlefield).247 Since these ser-
vices are provided by individual firms rather than by the state, risks may merely be
shifted such that some workers must seek employment in firms that cannot afford such
selectivity. What such intervention does not achieve, however, is elimination of the
objective causes of injuries that inhere in a profit-driven competitive system. Such
242. David Graulich, Company or Patient? Corporate Physicians Torn by Dual Loyalty, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 8, 1975, at 1.
243. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1830: OCCUPATIONAL INJU-
RIES AND ILLNESSES BY INDUSTRY, 1972, at 6-9, 98 (1974).
244. Hugh Conway et al., The Occupational Safety and Health Administration's 1990-1991 Survey
of Occupational Medical Surveillance Prevalence and Type of Current Practices, 35 J. OCCUPATIONAL
MED. 659, tbl. 2 at 662 (1993).
245. Supra note 243, at 6.
246. See SABINE KAISER, GEWERKSCHAFFEN UND MEDIZIN 2: BETRIEBSARTZLICHE VERSORGUNO IN
DER BRD UND IN ANDEREN EG-STAATEN 72-84 (1973).
247. See OECD, EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK, July 1989, at 139.
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causes should not be confused with so-called technical defects, which are nothing but
economic decisions made at a previous stage of production.248
Is It Worth Getting Killed at Work?
You never balance the wage against the risk; you balance the wage against
the alternative. And the alternative is starving when you're put in this situation.
That's what so phony about this cost/benefit analysis. A worker in the plant doesn't
say, "Well, I'm getting $6.50 an hour so I'm gonna take this risk." The worker
says, "I'm getting $6.50 an hour. If I open my mouth I might get nothing an hour,
or I might get minimum wage. In that case, I can't afford to live." So, what's the
difference? There's no difference for a person in that position. Either way they're
trapped.249
One of the uses to which economists and public policy analysts have put indus-
trial fatality data is to test whether labor markets provide a private consensual mecha-
nism for achieving the socially "optimal amount of accident risk exposure" so as to
maximize the difference between total benefits-unimpeded production creating wages
for workers, profits for firms, and products for consumers-and costs-purportedly
including the physical, mental, and economic costs to workers.2" Perfectly competi-
tive labor markets are said to create incentives for firms, which are assumed to inter-
nalize all accident costs, to take measures to reduce injury levels sufficiently to be able
to recruit workers with as small a wage premium as possible.251
Thus, according to the original version of this thesis, Adam Smith's doctrine of
compensatory wages, if an industry, such as construction, is extraordinarily hazardous,
its workers will be indemnified for the uncommon risks to which they are exposed:
"The wages of labour vary with the ease or hardship, the cleanliness or dirtiness, the
honourableness or dishonourableness of the employment.... In trades which are
known to be very un-wholesome, the wages of labour are always remarkably high."
This tendency to equality of the "whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the
different employments" presupposed, to be sure, that "every man was perfectly free
both to chuse what occupation he thought proper, and to change it as often as he
thought proper.""
Smith assumed, in other words, that workers do not knowingly accept unsafe
employment without some offsetting benefit such as a wage higher than that associated
with a less unsafe job. Smith did not credit the possibility that some workers might be
constrained to perform dangerous work without additional compensation simply be-
cause the alternative was that they and their family would "'all starve together."'253
248. See HANS-ULRICH DEPPE, INDUSTRIEARBEIT UND MEDIZIN: EIN BErrRAG ZUR SOZIOLOGIE
MEDIZINISCHER INSTITUTIONEN AM BEISPIEL DES WERKSARTZLICHEN DIENSTES IN DER BRD 113-14, 151
(1973).
249. DOROTHY NELKIN & MICHAEL BROWN, WORKERS AT RISK: VOICES FROM THE WORKPLACE
91 (1984) (interview with chemical operator in food processing plant).
250. James Chelius, The Control of Industrial Accidents: Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence,
38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 700, 702 (1974).
251. See, e.g., Robert McLean et al., Compensating Wage Differentials for Hazardous Work: An
Empirical Analysis, Q. REV. ECON. & Bus., Autumn 1978, at 97.
252. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
100, 110, 99 (Random House 1937) (1776).
253. See, e.g., W. RORABAUGH, THE CRAFT APPRENTICE: FROM FRANKLIN TO THE MACHINE AGE
IN AMERICA 131 (1986) (quoting a mid-nineteenth-century journeyman). Why under these circumstances
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Nor could his model accommodate the possibility that workers tolerated unsafe
workplaces for fear that they might lose their livelihood. An incident in Britain in the
1980s presented the starkest imaginable illustration of this pressure: the parents of a
seventeen-year-old worker whose arm had been trapped in a machine not only prom-
ised to waive compensation, but even to pay for the damage to the machine-if only
their son could retain his job.'
With alacrity nineteenth-century Anglo-American courts adopted the Smithian
fiction of free and equal contracting between atomized labor and aggregated capital in
adjudicating workers' personal injury claims against their employers. In the first U.S.
case testing and denying an employer's liability for such negligence,' a concurring
judge asserted in 1841 that: "No prudent man would engage in any perilous employ-
ment, unless seduced by greater wages than he could earn in a pursuit unattended by
any unusual danger."' And the following year, in a decision that would reverberate
to workers' detriment into the next century, Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court held that a worker employed to perform specified services
"takes upon himself the natural and ordinary risks and perils incident to the perfor-
mance of such services, and in legal presumption, the compensation is adjusted accord-
ingly. ' ' 7
Yet neither the judiciary nor the economics profession was hermetically impervi-
ous to a more realistic analysis of the allegedly free occupational choices made by the
working class. While granting that Smith's conclusions followed from his premises,
John Stuart Mill found the real world of the 1850s staggeringly different from the one
that Smith had conjured up. In an economy permanently shaped by widespread unem-
ployment:
The really exhausting and ... repulsive labours, instead of being better paid than
others, are almost invariably paid the worst of all, because performed by those who
have no choice. It would be otherwise in a favourable state of the general labour
market .... But when the supply of labour so far exceeds the demand that to find
employment at all is an uncertainty, and to be offered it on any terms a favour, the
case is totally the reverse .... The more revolting the occupation, the more certain
it is to receive the minimum of remuneration, because it devolves on the most
helpless and degraded .... [T]he inequalities of wages are generally in an opposite
direction to the equitable principle of compensation erroneously represented by
Adam Smith as the general law of the remuneration of labour. The hardships and
the earnings, instead of being directly proportional, as in any just arrangements of
society they would be, are generally in an inverse ratio to one another."8
Nor was Mill alone in this heterodox view. Even as conservative an institution as
the British High Court pierced the Smithian fiction as early as 1888. In ruling in favor
of a carpenter who had sued an employer for negligently causing his workplace injury,
the non-Smithian outcome is "unfortunate[] for all concerned" including the employer is unclear. LAW-
RENCE BAcow, BARGAINING FOR JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH 52 (1980).
254. K. WEDDERBURN, THE WORKER AND THE LAW 419 (3d ed. 1986) (1965).
255. For speculation as to why such reported cases appeared so late, see BARTRIP & BURMAN,
THE WOUNDED SOLDIERS OF INDUSTRY at 24-25, 103-105.
256. Murray v. South Carolina R.R., 26 S.C.L. (I McMul.) 385, 402 (1841).
257. Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 57 (1842).
258. JOHN STUART MILL, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 388 (W. Ashley ed. 1926)
(1852).
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the court offered a model of legal realism: "If the plaintiff could have gone away from
the dangerous place without incurring the risk of losing his means of livelihood, the
case might have been different; but he was obliged to be there; his poverty, not his
will, consented to incur the damage. 259
About the same time, Alfred Marshall, Mill's successor as the English-speaking
world's foremost economist, advanced a variant of this particular attack on the
Smithian presumption-albeit from a social Darwinian viewpoint.2 Equalizing dif-
ferences were inapplicable to
the disagreeableness of work ... if it is of such a kind that it can be done by those
whose industrial abilities are of a very low order. For the progress of science has
kept alive many people who are unfit for any but the lowest grade of work. They
compete eagerly for the comparatively small quantity of work for which they are
fitted, and in their urgent need they think almost exclusively of the wages they can
earn: they cannot afford to pay much attention to incidental discomforts ....
Hence arises the paradoxical result that the dirtiness of some occupations is a
cause of the lowness of the wages earned in them. For employers find that this
dirtiness adds much to the wages they would have to pay to get the work done by
skilled men of high character working with improved appliances; and so they often
adhere to old methods which require only unskilled workers of but indifferent
character, and who can be hired for low.., wages, because they are not worth
much to any employer."
The belated clamor for workers' compensation legislation in the United States
during the first decade of the twentieth century brought in its wake a fresh onslaught
on Smithianism emanating from the highest office. In a special message to Congress,
President Theodore Roosevelt himself observed that: "In theory, if wages were always
freely and fairly adjusted, they would always include an allowance as against the risk
of injury, just as certainly as the rate of interest for money includes an allowance for
insurance against the risk of loss." In fact, however, the workers' world did not work
that way.2 P. Tecumseh Sherman, the legal expert of the influential pro-corporate
National Civic Federation, testifying before the New York State Commission on Em-
ployers Liability, went even farther: "These people are not free to leave these hazard-
ous employments and to go to non-hazardous employments. As a mass they are bound
by necessity to the work. [T]here is no free assumption; it is forced assumption." 263
And that commission itself recommended enactment of a workers' compensation pro-
gram because "the laissez faire system of political economy ... does not work
out."
Such anti-Smithian arguments have, however, fallen out of favor. Contemporary
orthodox economists may concede that wages are formed differently than other com-
modity prices265 but nevertheless adhere to the mechanistic notion of "equalizing dif-
259. Thrussell v. Handyside, 20 Q.B.D. 359, 364 (1888).
260. For a similar approach, see SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 356-
57 (1920) (1897).
261. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 464 (8th ed. 1969) (1890).
262. 42 CONG. REc. 1347 (1908).
263. [NEW YORK STATE COMM. ON EMPLOYERS LIABILITY], MINUTES OF EVIDENCE 17 (1910).
264. [NEW YORK STATE COMM. ON EMPLOYERS LIABILITYI, REPORT at 7.
265. "[Tlhe human being as the bearer of labor performance is not only a factor of production,
but, with his wishes and purposes, the starting point and goal of all economic activity in general."
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ferences."2" According to W. Kip Viscusi, the theory's chief academic proponent in
the industrial injury context, the Smithian claim "that individuals require higher wages
to accept jobs they view as hazardous" hinges on two minimal prerequisites: "that
workers prefer being healthy to being dead or injured and that they prefer more con-
sumption to less."267
Contrary to Viscusi's assertion, however, the model of perfect competition under-
lying the doctrine of equalizing differences implicitly assumes a much broader array of
worker characteristics and a set of employer-employee relationships that are far from
typical: equal bargaining power, infinite mobility, and encyclopedic information."' In
contemporary econometric modeling, like nineteenth-century judicial opinions, "[tihe
economic compulsion which left [the worker] no choice except starvation, or equally
dangerous employment elsewhere, [ius entirely disregarded." 2 Thus, for example,
workers who are considerably more disadvantaged by their employer's power or right
to fire them at-will than the employer is discomfited by their freedom to quit are hard-
ly in a position to demand the elimination of unsafe working conditions.
Attempts by those late-twentieth-century economists who bother to take note of
Mill's "paradox that the most attractive jobs in society are also the highest paid" to
reconcile it with Smith's notion of compensatory wages reinforce rather than under-
mines Mill's position. Thus again according to Viscusi:
a worker with greater wealth will be less willing to incur job risks or ... the pre-
mium necessary to induce him to accept any particular risk will be greater.
This behavior is similar to many other patterns of consumer choice. Richer
consumers purchase better cuts of meat, more comprehensive health insurance, and
higher-quality cars. The influence of a worker's wealth on his willingness to incur
an occupational risk arises from a similar variation in tastes .... Individuals at the
top of the occupational hierarchy ... have a wider range of work opportunities.
Their more affluent economic status will be reflected in a lower willingness to
boost their income even further through work on a hazardous job .... ."
Instead of resolving the alleged paradox, Viscusi has merely rephrased Mill's
theory of noncompeting groups: workers without choices are compelled to submit to
fatal risks that others are in a position to avoid. When, in addition, employers in partic-
ularly unsafe industries reorganize production processes in order to replace skilled
workers (who have choices) with less skilled workers, who have fewer opportunities to
avoid hazardous employment, firms can recruit a labor force without offering any
significant premia"'
Because the absence of the Smithian prerequisites has historically made the doc-
trine of compensatory wages unrealistic, early advocates of workers' compensation
ERICH SCHNEIDER, EINFUHRUNG IN DIE WIRTSCHAFTsTHEORIE, II. TEn. 374 (1967).
266. See e.g., PAUL SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 579 (9th ed. 1973).
267. W. Viscusi, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS: AN INVESTIGATION OF MARKET PERFORMANCE 271
(1979).
268. See Oi, supra note 219, at 695 n.70 ("A worker could, conceivably, go from plant to plant
and examine the posted annual summaries [of injuries required by OSHA] to see which plant had the
best industrial safety record last year").
269. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 506 (1941).
•270. W. VIscusi, RISK BY CHOICE at 45-46.
271. JAMES ROBINSON, TOIL AND TOXiCS: WORKPLACE STRUGGLES AND POLITICAL STRATEGIES
FOR OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 75-94 (1991).
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programs took the position that: "This legal fiction ... has no basis in fact; railroad
trainmen, for instance, obtain no more than the wages of ordinary laborers, although
one out of every eleven of them is seriously injured every year. [O]ther workmen in
extrahazardous trades are paid no more than laborers in other'occupations excepting
where the matter of skill enters into the question.""'2 Another proponent of state in-
tervention even charged that "dangerous trades really pay lower rather than higher
wages, or, stated in another form, such industries command the services of only the
poorly paid laborers."273 Recent econometric studies confirm the absence of statistical
significance between wage rates and occupational death rates." And even Viscusi is
constrained to conclude from his empirical study that "blue-collar workers in the more
hazardous occupations do not receive additional remuneration that is sufficiently great
to be visible to the casual observer."275 Risk premia for fatal injuries that have been
calculated in the range of a few percentage points27 cannot support the claim that the
labor market fully compensates such workers for the risks to which their employer
exposes them.2" Even state intervention in the form of workers' compensation pro-
grams fails to close the gap-especially in states where they provide poverty-level
replacement benefits far below the worker's average income or exclude whole groups
of workers such as agricultural workers, who are exposed to extraordinary risks. 8
Recent surveys cast further doubt on the Smithian dogma by showing that, al-
though workers with tenure of one to three months incurred three times as many inju-
ries as those with one to three years tenure and eight times as many injuries as those
with more than twenty years tenure, fewer than 30 percent of beginners reported severe
hazards to management compared to 70 percent of workers who had been at a place of
employment between five and ten years.279 As a chemical worker, for example, who
expressed great trepidation about the "white, drippy, slimy stuff ... hanging all over"
him as a result of being required to work in a lime kiln, remarked: "Most guys won't
tell their foreman, 'I'm not going to do it,' because they just got hired and they'll lose
their job .... We don't really have a choice. I can't refuse to work knowing that
tomorrow I can get another job. I can't look for a year and a half for a job. I'd lose
everything."2 '
As OSHA was going into effect in 1971, several dozen Wall Street Journal
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reporters inadvertently launched an impressive assault on the doctrine of equalizing
difference while examining the question as to why a worker would "continue to work
at a job that has cost him his health and paid him a wage that he has had to struggle
on all his grown life." In the course of discovering that "Brutal, Mindless Labor Re-
mains a Daily Reality for Millions in the U.S.," the journalists kept hearing the same
answer: "'There aren't many jobs around here for a high school dropout .... I'd leave
in a minute, but where would I go?' That is the dilemma of millions of relatively
unskilled laborers .... They mine coal, shovel steel slag, gut animal carcasses."
Asked why he tended iron melting furnaces in 140 heat, another worker responded
that "[t]here's only three choices-work, starve, or go to jail." Although coke oven
workers "exhibit considerable militancy about pollution and safety ... the men know
that, in the end, the company has the upper hand. 'As long as the company can get
another man to take your job if you go home, they'll do nothing."' Why did coke oven
workers at a U.S. Steel Corporation plant who walked under walls of flames and on
bricks as hot as 180 and inhaled such quantities of toxins that they were "ten times
more likely to die of lung cancer than the average steelworker," nevertheless receive "a
low wage for a steelworker"? This particular anti-Smithian outcome may have been
overdetermined by the racially discriminatory assignment of an overwhelmingly black
work force to this uncompensatedly life-threatening work.2"' This aspect of racism,
far from being confined to a few plants, is a statistically significant macroeconomic
phenomenon.2"
The finding that union workers secure higher risk premia for hazardous jobs than
do atomized workers casts additional doubt on the "'adequacy' of the nonunion mar-
ket."'83 Unless they are employed in highly unionized industries, "[wiorkers in very
hazardous occupations.., do not receive meaningful levels of hazard pay."2 In-
deed, several studies have even shown negative compensating wage differentials for
nonunion workers exposed to fatal hazards.2" This divergence results from differenc-
es not only in bargaining power but also in knowledge: a union with thousands of
members knows that a certain number have been and will be injured every year where-
as an individual worker may underestimate her risk level by generalizing from limited
experience."'
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A comparison of unionized and nonunionzed construction and non-construction
laborers will illustrate this point. Construction laborers are exposed to one of the high-
est occupational fatality rates in the United States. From 1980 to 1989, 39.5 per
100,000 of them were killed on the job compared to about 17 among non-construction
laborers; during the same period, the corresponding rates for all construction workers
and all workers were 25.6 and 7.0 respectively.287 For 1992, the Census of Fatal Oc-
cupational Injuries revealed a 3 to 1 ratio in fatality rates between construction and
non-construction laborers.2" A study of unprecedented detail conducted by the BLS
shed light on union-nonunion wage differentials in 1970. Among year-round, full-time
construction laborers, 34 percent of whom were unionized, unionists' median annual
earnings were 70 percent greater than those of their nonunion counterparts.289 Among
non-construction laborers, 46 percent of whom were organized, the union premium was
48 percent. 290 Among unionists, construction laborers' earnings were 13 percent
greater than those of their non-construction counterparts, whereas those of nonunionists
in construction were actually 1 percent lower than their non-construction counter-
parts.291' Nonunion construction laborers thus received no additional compensation for
subjecting themselves to a significantly higher risk of being killed on the job than their
non-construction counterparts. Although unionized construction laborers were able to
extract a greater premium vis-A-vis their nonunion competitors than any other occupa-
tional group, their premium over the wages of their non-construction counterparts, who
face a much smaller chance of being killed, is modest.
Modified surveys for 1977 and 1980 compared mean weekly earnings of full-
time workers who were and were not represented by labor organizations (the data for
1980 are in parentheses). The earnings premium of the 40 (47) percent of construction
laborers who were represented was 55 (34) percent vis-A-vis the unrepresented; among
non-construction laborers the corresponding figures were 46 (45) percent and 50 (44)
percent. Represented construction laborers' earnings were only 12 (7) percent higher
than those of their non-construction counterparts, whereas among the unrepresented the
premium was 8 (16) percent.292 By the end of the 1970s, organized construction
laborers' earnings premium vis-A-vis the unorganized not only shrank, but ceased to be
287. Supra note 164, Injury Hazards in the Construction Industry at 140-41. The figure for non-
construction laborers is estimated because it had to be read off a graph.
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an outlier.
Recent empirical psychological experiments have further undermined the plausi-
bility of the Smithian compensation doctrine. The crucial concept here is the disparity
between the willingness to buy and the willingness to sell or accept an entitlement.
293
Consider a worker whose weekly wage is $300 and faces a 1 in 1,000 risk of being
injured. When asked by her employer, who controls the workplace and thus owns the
entitlement in question, how much she would be willing to pay the employer to intro-
duce changes that would reduce that risk to 1 in 10,000, she offers $30. Now consider
the (counterfactual) case in which the worker owns the entitlement and the employer
must secure the worker's consent to changes in the process of production that would
bring about an increase in injury risk from 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 1,000. Extrapolation
from analogous experiments suggests that the smallest bribe that the worker would
demand might be more than one order of magnitude larger than the largest amount she
is willing to pay for a proportionate increase in safety.2" The first survey of willing-
ness to exchange money for increases or decreases in workplace fatal accident risks,
though methodologically biased toward underestimation, nevertheless found that re-
spondents demanded almost three times as much in annual wage increases to accept an
increment in risk as the wage that they would forego to obtain a decrement of the
same magnitude.295
This kind of disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to sell is driv-
en by several forces. First, although universal marketization and the concomitant for-
mation of a market price may induce people to value fungible commodities more or
less identically whether they are buying or selling, this tendency vanishes with regard
to a unique, non-reproducible good such as health and safety. Here people "are usually
willing to sell the right to be free from increased mortality risks for considerably more
than they are willing to pay for reduced mortality risks." Thus a second way of ex-
plaining the disparity is that contrary to Coase's theorem, which assumes that out-
comes are independent of the initial assignment of the entitlement as between buyer
and seller, "most of us can demand much more in a bargain in which we are asked to
sacrifice something of great value to which we have a 'right' than we can afford to
pay for that same thing if someone else has the right to take it from us."'
Finally, disparity between buying and selling valuations also results from the
diminishing marginal utility of income and/or the asymmetrical valuation that market
participants attach to losing already realized income and receiving additional income.
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Consequently, losing income equal to 10 percent of a given standard of living dimin-
ishes satisfaction considerably more than a 10 percent rise in income would increase
satisfaction. Thus if workers whose existing budgets exhaust their income were re-
quired to buy safety entitlements with income they already have, but had to sell such
entitlements for additions to current income, it is plausible that the price at which they
would be willing to sell would exceed that at which they would buy.2"
Since all wage-premium studies are implicitly based on the real-capitalist premise
that the employer owns the entitlement,2" they must significantly understate the pre-
mium that would result from a system in which workers held workplace safety and
health entitlements and employers were the supplicants. Consequently, "the economic
positivist's methodological insistence on propositions that can be tested creates a strong
bias, not merely in favor of markets, but also in favor of the status quo assignment of
entitlements."' To be sure, in a full-employment economy workers might hold a
market-based entitlement to avoid dangerous jobs such that competition for labor
would compel employers either to improve working conditions or to raise wages suffi-
ciently to induce workers to sell that right.' Absent such a transformation of capital-
ism, however, the pseudo-positivist fictional reconstruction of implicitly bargained-for
compensating wage differentials not only atavistically resurrects the patently unrealistic
and biased judicial doctrines of the pre-workers' compensation period, but also logical-
ly supports dismantling OSHA's incipient transformation of the fictitious industrial
safety and, health market into a non-transferable entitlement. President Reagan's Coun-
cil of Economic Advisers, for example, adopted a position embodying all of these ele-
ments." '
Employers' cavalier and almost aggressive admission of the unreality of the
Smithian assumption of a perfectly competitive labor market is tragicomic. Thus in
congressional testimony reminiscent of the vindication of the equal right of the rich
and poor to sleep under bridges, the president of the Associated General Contractors of
America (and future governor of Mississippi) was asked whether a construction worker
who is asked by an unscrupulous employer to go into a ditch lacking supports has the
right to refuse. Kirk Fordice replied: "Yes, sir, I certainly do. He has to risk his em-
ployment, I presume, in that situation. But certainly, any individual should have that
right. '"2
In spite of this brazenly stripped-down version of freedom, which amounts to
little more than the absence of slavery-and, in addition, misstates the law since, under
certain exigent circumstances, workers are entitled to refuse to subject themselves to
unsafe conditions although they may have to spend years vindicating that
right"3 -- construction is said to provide concrete historical examples of the Smithian
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compensatory mechanism. Thus according to Stanley Lebergott, a leading labor statisti-
cian and economic historian:
[A] mighty influence buoying up wages paid to the men building canals during the
1820s and 1830s was the danger of yellow fever and malaria. Built through marsh
and swamps ... to reduce construction problems, the canals were known as kill-
ers .... In upstate New York in the 1830s and 1840s grown men received $10 to
$12 for farm work, but thirteen-year-old boys driving an Erie canal boat through
the regions where hundreds died during the cholera season were paid as much.
With boys customarily being paid markedly less than men, and certainly for less
arduous work, the differential presumably reflected the dangers of cholera and
malaria associated with being a "canawler." The allowance for unhealthy working
conditions was a quite explicit part of entrepreneurial calculations.'
How a few dollars compensated a child for his failure to survive beyond the age
of thirteen remains unclear.35 It is this perspective, which regards work injuries not
as a 'societal problem but "at most as an economic problem," that became incorporated
in workers' compensation statutes.' As advocates of workers' compensation pro-
grams during the Progressive Era were wont to stress: "For the ... delirium of terror
in the fall through endless hollow squares of steel beams down to the death-delaying
construction planks of the rising skyscraper... there can be no compensation."'
Continuous with this emphasis on the inherently nonfungible, nonexchangeable, and
noncompensable nature of physical and mental well-being is the reaction of (the adult
children of) unionized miners. From an industry that perpetuated "the notion that the
added production costs of available safety procedure were less acceptable than contin-
ued death" they demanded not additional compensation for exposing themselves to the
risk of "never coming out" alive and thus joining the more than 100,000 miners who
have been killed in this century, but safer conditions.'
In order to dull this insight into the incommensurability between life and money,
"[a] discourse and institutional practices are needed to harmonize the [employer-em-
ployee] relationship so that the blood-money exchange can be conducted without call-
ing into question the moral basis of the relationship within which the suffering was
created."' In the latter part of the twentieth century, entrepreneurial opposition to
state intervention such as OSHA has coalesced with a broader based ideology and
practice of universal marketization to resurrect the requisite discourse. The Smithian
model of perfect competition presupposes the absence of external economies such that
each agent bears all the costs of its decisions.1 Yet the failure of firms to internalize
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the entire economic-let alone social-cost of the injuries caused by their operations
underscores the fundamental difference in the way capitalist economies and their legal
systems treat the productive wear and tear of human beings on the one hand and the
means of production on the other. In order to spread the cost of a large and risky
investment in machines over as many product units as possible before that equipment
becomes obsolete, firms have an incentive to operate them as quickly and as continu-
ously as possible. "Capitalistic enterprise thus naturally tends toward a long working
day and week. This, however ... produces fatigue among employees." '' To replace
deteriorated assets and thus to maintain the value of their capital investment intact,
firms include depreciation charges in their prices: "[N]o owner of durable factors of
production would be willing to make use of such agents, if some provision were not
made to compensate him for the deterioration of his asset."3 2
Why can human agents not make similar charges for their physical impairment?
After all, as a commissioner of the California Industrial Accident Commission ob-
served of the toll incurred in one of the early years of workers' compensation: "When
we kill in industry 23,000 men we have wiped out a property value of the Nation. ' '31 3
Why is it that "[i]f instead of 20,000 workers, 20,000 head of cattle were exposed to
certain death ... , there would be an easily calculable incentive to adopt required
preventive measures?" 314 Or as the United Brotherhood of Carpenters put it mecha-
nistically: "The injured workman is just as much an incident of the modern factory, as
is the damaged machine. Both are proper items of operating expense, and should come
out of the employers' profits. The only capital of the employee is his labor pow-
er.,
315
An historical example straddling capitalist and slave societies makes such "entre-
preneurial calculations" easier to grasp: 600 Irish immigrants died annually in the
1830s digging the Ponchartrain canal in the "fever-racked swamps around New Or-
leans" in pursuit of sixty cents more an hour than railway construction near Philadel-
phia paid because no slave owner would consider permitting his $900-slave to perish
for such a price. 316 Because the individual worker, as self-owned, lacks capital val-
ue,3 7 her inferior bargaining position, especially in periods of high unemployment,
makes it difficult for her to have her "claim to special financial compensation in case
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of hazardous occupations recognized by the entrepreneur.""3 ' Until society at large,
by means of comprehensive intervention, imposes full internalization of social costs on
firms and empowers workers to assume responsibility for their own health and safety
by shaping their working conditions, employers will continue to have an economic
incentive to economize on the use of their fixed capital by churning their labor force
and replacing worn-out workers with as yet unimpaired ones."
In a democratically organized society, complete injury data would enable workers
and consumers to deliberate on what to produce and how to produce it in order to
avoid or limit products created in production processes that according to society's
conscious determination unduly infringe on producers' physical and mental integri-
ty.32 Accurate fatality statistics remain "good stuff" to start that revolution with too.
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